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I. INTRODUCTION
In today’s divisive and fractious politics, one of the most damning
insults a politician can hurl is that another politician is politicizing
something that should remain apolitical. Typically, accusations of
politicization are made in response to politicians who use a high-profile event to underscore a need for action that fits their political
agenda. For example, when gun violence begets calls for gun control,
the National Rifle Association is likely to accuse those responses as
politicizing the issue.1 While the word, meaning “to give a political
tone or character to,”2 is neutral on its face, in practice it suggests a
person has taken an event or topic for which there was common consensus and deployed it in a way that appeals to only those citizens of a
particular political bent. Thus, politicization is in the eye of the
beholder.3
For many, the election of Joe Biden as President of the United
States signaled a welcome repudiation of the Trump Administration’s
1. See, e.g., NRA Criticizes Presidential Candidates After Mass Shootings, REUTERS
(Aug. 8, 2019, 2:39 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-shooting-politics/
nra-criticizes-presidential-candidates-after-mass-shootings-idUSKCN1UY2L9
[https://perma.cc/66BG-S6EP].
2. Politicize, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/polit
icize [https://perma.cc/E58G-GKFZ] (last visited Aug. 24, 2021).
3. Chris Tognotti, How “Politicize” Became Such a Dirty Word, BUSTLE (Nov. 1,
2017), https://www.bustle.com/p/what-does-politicize-even-mean-how-the-termturned-into-a-dirty-word-3201398 [https://perma.cc/7ED7-UC6L].
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use of federal regulatory policy for purely political goals and a longawaited return to data-driven, science-based regulatory policy.
Throughout his campaign for President and as President-elect, Joe
Biden consistently affirmed that scientific evidence would guide his
policy decisions regarding public health, the environment, and a host
of other areas. One of President Biden’s first executive orders declared
that his Administration would “listen to the science” and that the promulgation of regulations would be “protected by processes that ensure
the integrity of Federal decision-making.”4
Approaching policy decisions with science and data at the forefront
appears to have been an effective campaign position after four years of
the particularly feckless and anti-science Trump Administration. But
what does it mean to listen to the science? For that matter, what public policy decisions require listening to the science? Consider a timely
topic. Given that studies show masks that cover a person’s nose and
mouth are generally effective at reducing the spread of everything
from the common cold to COVID-19,5 what role should this science
play in determining whether there should be a public mask mandate?
Does spotlighting science to the near exclusion of all other considerations disguise the complexity in making public policy decisions that
require evaluation of competing values: human life versus comfort,
health versus convenience, or communal solidarity versus individualism? Much public discourse about masks—along with many other contentious policy debates—obscures these fundamental value choices in
favor of attributing the reasons for difficult public policy decisions to
science. While perhaps an attractive framing useful for politicians,
this practice has a corrosive effect on our ability to govern ourselves,
and no part of government exemplifies this effect more than the administrative state.
American administrative law frequently discounts or ignores participation by ordinary citizens without specialized knowledge or expertise. Regulatory policymakers are often expected to justify agency
decisions on scientific, or at least technical, grounds in response to notice and comment procedures or judicial review. There is a certain
logic to these demands when applied to an administrative state simultaneously buffeted by concerns over its ability to legitimately impose
value judgments and entrusted with increasingly politically salient
decisions. However, that logic reveals something fundamental about
administrative law that too often goes unexamined: Science cannot
dictate policy. Policy—whatever it happens to be—relies inescapably
on contentious moral commitments to the values the policy is intended
to fulfill, including commitments to other citizens, one’s country, the
4. Exec. Order No. 13,990, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,037 (Jan. 20, 2021).
5. See, e.g., Yafang Cheng et al., Face Masks Effectively Limit the Probability of
SARS-CoV-2 Transmission, 372 SCIENCE 1439 (2021).
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environment, fairness, justice, and so on. This may seem like a simple
and obvious point, but it is a powerful one. For if it is obvious that
administrative regulation is based not solely on science but also on
political values, then agencies must be able to justify their exercise of
political power based on more than just science or expertise. By relying too heavily on the justificatory power of scientific reasoning, we
lose sight of the important and necessary role of self-government in
settling contentious moral questions at the center of regulatory policy.
Put differently, in exclusively listening to the science, the administrative state displaces everyday people from active public engagement
with contemporary issues.6 Citizens have lost the ability to control the
fate of their political community because they are unable to contest,
and ultimately choose, the values that will govern their community
through common action.7
This Article argues that one reason Americans remain so distrustful of their own government, despite the astounding advancement of
the administrative state’s technical and scientific abilities, is that
technocratic justifications deny virtually any role for democratically
determined moral judgments in administrative rulemaking and mask
the part those moral judgment do play.8 Though administrative
rulemaking has been defended on the inoffensive “good government”
shibboleths of political neutrality, rationality, and technocratic expertise, distrust in American government has never been higher. In fact,
according to the Pew Research Center, only seventeen percent of
Americans had faith in the federal government “to do the right thing”
in March 2019.9 In sharp contrast, seventy-three percent of Americans had trust and confidence in the federal government in 1958.10
Notwithstanding a few temporary reversals, that trust has been
steadily eroding since 1958, and has remained below twenty-five percent for the last eleven years.11
6. Tina Nabatchi et al., Public Administration in Dark Times: Some Questions for
the Future of the Field, 21 J. PUB. ADMIN. RSCH. & THEORY i29, i33 (2011).
7. See Donald J. Maletz, Making Non-Citizens: Consequences of Administrative Centralization in Tocqueville’s Old Regime, 33 PUBLIUS 17, 35 (2003) (“If the political
dimension of the administration is overlooked, if the day-to-day affairs of a community become nothing but opportunities for the exercise of administrative paternalism, the individuality that modern democracy wishes to ensure is likely to
turn into . . . radical separateness.”).
8. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2353
(2001) (commenting on the tension caused by unelected bureaucrats making “essentially political choices” for which they have “neither democratic warrant nor
special competence”).
9. Public Trust in Government: 1958–2021, PEW RSCH. CTR. (May 17, 2021), https://
www.pewresearch.org/politics/2019/04/11/public-trust-in-government-1958-2019/
[https://perma.cc/M7CC-BXPQ].
10. Id.
11. Id. One might argue that the Trump Administration’s disdain for professionalism
and expertise in the administrative state caused the lack of faith in American
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Many factors undoubtedly contribute to Americans’ lack of faith in
their government, including great convulsions like Watergate, the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Great Recession. Less sudden,
but no less significant, are facts of everyday life: income inequality,
stagnant wages, environmental degradation, crumbling infrastructure, and disintegrating communities. But since March of 2019, the
situation has markedly worsened. Distrust in government has
morphed into conspiracy theories about the deep state, persistent
claims that the 2020 presidential election was stolen, a total lack of
faith in the judges and civil servants who found no evidence of voter
fraud, and culminated in the storming of the Capitol Building on January 6, 2021.12
The creation of policy by the relatively insulated administrative
state is associated with a decrease in citizens’ perception of the value
of government and what it provides,13 making citizens vulnerable to
populist, anti-establishment political movements and further stoking
the public’s distrust.14 Populist and anti-establishment politicians
have seized on citizens’ dwindling trust in and estrangement from
government and each other15 by sounding a call to take government
back from bureaucrats and political insiders and return it to the people.16 In an effort to satisfy his supporters and solidify his political
position, then-President Trump promised to deconstruct the adminis-

12.

13.

14.
15.

16.

government today. However, despite the Obama Administration’s public effort to
place professionalism and expertise at the center of its policy choices, see Memorandum on Scientific Integrity, 74 Fed. Reg. 10,671, 10,671 (Mar. 11, 2009), trust
in government during the Obama Administration never rose above twenty-five
percent, Public Trust in Government: 1958–2021, supra note 9. It remains to be
seen whether President Biden can reverse this trend.
See Timothy Snyder, The American Abyss: A Historian of Fascism and Political
Atrocity on Trump, the Mob and What Comes Next, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 9,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/09/magazine/trump-coup.html [https://
perma.cc/CE83-X7V9].
Robert F. Durant & Susannah Bruns Ali, Repositioning American Public Administration? Citizen Estrangement, Administrative Reform, and the Disarticulated
State, 73 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 278, 279 (2013) (noting that the current design of
administrative structures has a negative effect on citizens’ sense of political efficacy, “reduc[ing] the propensity of citizens to pay attention to government, value
what it does for them, participate in the political process, and be mobilizable for
political action”).
Yascha Mounk, The Undemocratic Dilemma, 29 J. DEMOCRACY 98, 100 (2018).
About six in ten Americans have little or no confidence in the ability of their
fellow citizens to make political choices. Michael Dimock, How Americans View
Trust, Facts, and Democracy Today, PEW TR. MAG. (Feb. 19, 2020), https://
www.pewtrusts.org/en/trust/archive/winter-2020/how-americans-view-trustfacts-and-democracy-today [https://perma.cc/9VZ4-3FUP].
See, e.g., Nadia Urbinati, The Pandemic Hasn’t Killed Populism: After
Lockdowns, Demagogues Will Likely Resurge, FOREIGN AFFS. (Aug. 6, 2020),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-08-06/pandemichasnt-killed-populism [https://perma.cc/LD26-SV97].
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trative state.17 He also publicized portrayals of himself as personally
in control of regulation content,18 prompting Democrats to accuse him
of politicizing the federal bureaucracy and further eroding trust in
government.19 As a result, liberals and Democrats pushed to insulate
the administrative state from populist political incursions as an expert and professional check on a President’s raw political interests.20
While insulating the administrative state may protect it from the
President, it fails to address Americans’ growing sense that they are
no longer in control of their political lives and thus fails to discourage
determined populist incursions.
Although numerous theories have been proposed as a foundation
for the administrative state,21 modern commentators typically advo17. See Z. Byron Wolf, Steve Bannon Outlines His Plan To ‘Deconstruct’ Washington,
CNN (Feb. 24, 2017, 1:28 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/23/politics/stevebannon-world-view/index.html [https://perma.cc/UU78-HBLM] (noting that one
core pillar of President Trump’s platform is “deconstruction of the administrative
state”); CNN, Steve Bannon Makes Rare Public Remarks at CPAC, YOUTUBE, at
10:28 (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OLzpv7D_xLs [https://
perma.cc/93V3-9ZHB]; Jon Michaels, How Trump Is Dismantling a Pillar of the
American State, GUARDIAN (Nov. 7, 2017, 8:36 AM), https://www.theguardian.
com/commentisfree/2017/nov/07/donald-trump-dismantling-american-administrative-state.
18. See, e.g., Matthew Yglesias, Trump’s Tweets About Saving the “Suburban Lifestyle Dream,” Explained, VOX (Aug. 3, 2020, 10:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/2020/
8/3/21347565/suburban-lifestyle-dream-trump-tweets-fair-housing [https://
perma.cc/A6XQ-WTRU]; Kelsey Brugger, Trump Unveils Landmark Rewrite of
NEPA Rules, E&E NEWS (Jan. 9, 2020, 1:35 PM), https://www.eenews.net/stories/
1062036913; Lucas Manfredi, Trump Unveils Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient Vehicles Rule, FOX BUS. (July 16, 2020), https://www.foxbusiness.com/money/trumpunveils-safer-affordable-fuel-efficient-vehicles-rule [https://perma.cc/8D3AFPXB].
19. Zolan Kanno-Youngs & Jesse McKinley, Meet the Official Accused of Helping
Trump Politicize Homeland Security, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2020), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/08/04/us/politics/trump-homeland-security.html [https://
perma.cc/9VDL-4Z58]; Lisa Friedman & Brad Plumer, Trump’s Response to Virus
Reflects a Long Disregard for Science, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2020), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/04/28/climate/trump-coronavirus-climate-science.html
[https://perma.cc/8DXM-V8RN]; Sharon LaFraniere et al., F.D.A. Allows Expanded Use of Plasma To Treat Coronavirus Patients, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/23/us/politics/fda-plasma-coronavirus.html?action=click&module=top%20Stories&pgtype=homepage [https://perma.cc/77LXLXRL].
20. See Robinson Meyer, Trump’s Interference with Science Is Unprecedented, ATL.
(Nov. 9, 2018, 5:16 PM), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/11/ex
perts-warn-trump-epa-meddling-scientific-method/575377/ [https://perma.cc/
VVE5-2Y8V]; Press Release, Steny H. Hoyer, Congressman, House of Representatives, House Democrats Re-Introduce Bill To Stop Research Agency Politicization and Relocation (Feb. 14, 2019), https://hoyer.house.gov/content/housedemocrats-re-introduce-bill-stop-research-agency-politicization-and-relocation
[https://perma.cc/K6KQ-CRBL].
21. See generally Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative
Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975) (describing responses to problems with the
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cate for presidential involvement in rulemaking, relying to greater
and lesser degrees on the professionalism and expertise of agency staff
to control political influence.22 However, modern legal scholars have
ignored the role of the administrative state in driving populist and
anti-establishment politics. Recognizing this link makes clear the
need to truly address the tension between the administrative state
and populism and the way that technocratic justification for regulation contributes to this tension by supplanting the ability of ordinary
citizens to participate in the process by contesting the values embodied in administrative rules. Thus, this Article adds to the debate by
proposing a theoretical framework from which to critique scholars’
continued faith in the politically neutral, technocratic approach to societal problems, and arguing that the administrative state should be
reoriented toward widespread democratic political control over its
decisions.
To respond to the twin problems of unsatisfying technocratic justifications for agency discretion and the destabilizing political backlash
that follows, this Article offers an alternative theory of political engagement based on a robust form of republicanism that supports widespread and direct participation in administrative decisions to
legitimize the value choices inherent in regulatory policy. By placing
the power to decide regulatory policy in the hands of the people, this
traditional model of administrative law, including alternative solutions and judicial efforts to curtail agency discretion by increasing interested parties’ participation in administrative decisions); Kagan, supra note 8, at 2245–385 (presenting
the canonical presidential control model for the administrative state).
22. On one end of the spectrum, scholars like then-Professor Elena Kagan and Professor Kathryn Watts advocate for fairly robust involvement of the President in
rulemaking with some technocratic limits. See Kagan, supra note 8, at 2319–83;
Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 40 (2009) (advocating for courts to make some room for
presidential political control in rulemaking, using technocratic rationality as a
guardrail to excessive influence). Somewhere in the middle, scholars understand
the relative electoral legitimacy of presidential involvement in rulemaking but
construct elaborate controls on presidential influence. See Mark Seidenfeld, The
Role of Politics in a Deliberative Model of the Administrative State, 81 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1397, 1452 (2013) (arguing in favor of a highly limited form of
presidential control over agency rulemaking tempered by technocratic constraints). On the other end, scholars see the independence of administrative
agencies as an important check on presidential overreach. See Jon D. Michaels,
An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 582 (2015)
(arguing in favor of a more independent administrative state reliant on the professionalism and expertise of its staff to act as a check on the President’s political
preferences); Gillian E. Metzger, 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under
Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 83 (2017); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 461, 515 (2003) (arguing that administrative law should focus more on controlling arbitrary agency action and less on subjecting agency decision-making to
electoral accountability through control by the President).
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framework has the potential to emancipate the administrative state
from both technocratic insularity and dangerous political incursions
by unscrupulous Presidents. To guide this argument, I use a roughand-ready definition of legitimacy to mean a collective instinct that a
government action, by virtue of its enactment through certain procedures, commands our obedience and respect.23 Understood in this
way, legitimacy turns on a common understanding of the governed
and the collective moral sentiments of that political community.
Part I discusses the failure of notice and comment rulemaking to
engage the public in substantive agency policymaking by continuing a
commitment to technocratic government and examines the effect of
judicial expectations and ever-shifting standards of review for
rulemaking. Part II discusses how procedural liberalism is expressed
in the commitment to technocratic government we see today and the
ways technocratic government exacerbates the legitimacy problem it
attempts to solve. Part III addresses how presidential political control
is reintroduced, which further compounds problems of legitimacy.
Part IV addresses earlier attempts to apply republican political theory
to the administrative state and discusses why those attempts ultimately failed to distinguish themselves from liberal proceduralist accounts of the administrative state. Part V argues that a stronger form
of republicanism will be able to tackle the failures of earlier accounts
of administrative law and pave the way for more effective reform of
the administrative state. And, finally, Part VI suggests possible reforms to the administrative state.
II. “A BROKEN VENDING MACHINE”: THE SHORTCOMINGS
OF NOTICE AND COMMENT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
OF AGENCY ACTION
This Part examines the limited role the public currently plays in
the selection of values at the heart of regulations and how that insulation permits concentrated economic interests and powerful political
actors to make value choices that are best left to the public to decide.
The administrative state faces extreme pressure from regulated industries, members of Congress, the President’s staff in the Office of
23. My definition of legitimacy is drawn primarily from that given by Lord Jonathan
Sumption in his Reith Lectures. See generally Jonathan Sumption, The Reith Lectures 2019: Law and the Decline of Politics—Lecture 2: In Praise of Politics, BBC
RADIO 4 (May 28, 2019), https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/m0005f05 [https://
perma.cc/82A8-Y6HG]; see also JAMES O. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 10 (1978) (“The subject of
legitimacy is concerned with popular attitudes toward the exercise of governmental power. Such attitudes focus upon whether governmental power is being held
and exercised in accordance with a nation’s laws, values, traditions, and customs.”); Hanna Pitkin, Obligation and Consent—II, 60 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 39, 39
(1966) (“[L]egitimate authority is precisely that which ought to be obeyed . . . .”).
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Management and Budget, and even the President. Yet, regardless of
the actual reasons—political or otherwise—for an agency to regulate
in a certain manner, agencies continue to publicly justify their actions
by resorting to technocratic rationales. Agencies have both political
and legal incentives to disguise value judgments as expert or professional judgments. By doing so, agencies narrow the space left for the
public to influence the true values behind the regulations and, at the
same time, open those values to influence from Executive Branch
politics and concentrated economic interests with the resources to
couch their positions in professional analyses.
A.

Notice and Comment and Agency Technical
Justifications

Public participation in rulemaking is relatively limited and often
ineffectual; “few modern observers idealize existing methods of consultation” with the public.24 Notice and comment is the only direct and
formal way for the public to participate in regulatory lawmaking.25
Though some call it “refreshingly democratic,”26 notice and comment
has been variously likened to Kabuki theater27 and a charade.28 Despite its democratic purpose, notice and comment provides the general
public little, if any, influence over the substance of federal regulation
in practice.
Empirical studies show that regulated industries participate in far
more rulemakings than public interest organizations or the general
public.29 In their study of public participation in federal rulemaking,
Professor Wendy Wagner and her colleagues collected data regarding
engagement with hazardous air pollution rules promulgated by the
24. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L.
REV. 411, 423 (2005). Notice and comment is not “an ideal means of harvesting
public reactions to regulatory policies.” Id. at 424.
25. Of course, there are other indirect and informal ways to influence agencies. For
instance, individuals or groups that meet with agency staff can help shape regulatory policy. Additionally, members of Congress and the President and their
staff can impact agency rulemaking by asserting political pressure. However, the
vast majority of citizens do not have access to these avenues of influence.
26. Michael Asimow, On Pressing McNollgast to the Limits: The Problem of Regulatory Costs, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 129 (1994).
27. E. Donald Elliott likened notice and comment to “Japanese Kabuki theater” because it is “a highly stylized process for displaying in a formal way the essence of
something which in real life takes place in other venues.” E. Donald Elliott, ReInventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492 (1992).
28. David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP.
CT. REV. 201, 231–32 (2001).
29. See Wendy Wagner et al., Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s
Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 128–29 (2011); Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future, 55 DUKE
L.J. 943, 951 (2006) (noting that few ordinary citizens participate in rulemaking).
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Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)30 and found that industry
groups participated in the formal comment period for every single hazardous air pollution rule, submitting over eighty-one percent of total
comments.31 In contrast, public interest groups participated in about
half of those same rules and accounted for, on average, only four percent of comments filed.32 Professor Wagner’s study also revealed that
greater industry group participation led to greater influence on the
substance of the rule.33 Eighty-three percent of significant changes
weakened the final rule in favor of the regulated industry, and the
data showed that the greater the number of industry comments, the
greater the number of weakening changes to a particular rule.34 Comments seeking to strengthen rules were “not only fewer in number, but
less successful.”35
Other empirical studies on the participation and influence of regulated industries are consonant with Professor Wagner’s findings.36 In
a study of forty rulemakings across four agencies, Professors Jason
Webb Yackee and Susan Webb Yackee found that business interests
submitted over fifty-seven percent of comments, while public interest
groups submitted only six percent.37 The study also found that comments from business interests were much more likely to change the
substance of the rule.38
30. These particular rules were selected for study because the standards were required by statute, see 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d), which provided specific deadlines, and
because of the standards’ typicality. Wagner et al., supra note 29, at 119.
31. Wagner et al., supra note 29, at 128.
32. Id. at 129.
33. Id. at 130–31 (“Specifically, on average each rule involved twenty-two significant
issues raised by commenters in their comments and the EPA made changes in
response to slightly more than half (thirteen) of these comments and rejected the
rest.”).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 132 (“[W]hile EPA rejected about one-third of the comments intended to
weaken the rule, it rejected more than half of the comments to strengthen the
rule.”).
36. See Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128, 131, 133
(2006). According to a study of the significant EPA hazardous waste rules from
1989 to 1991, industry groups filed nearly sixty percent of all comments, while
individual citizens only filed six percent of comments. Coglianese, supra note 29.
This disparity was also evident in rulemaking proceedings, where at least one
comment was received from industry groups in ninety-six percent of proceedings
compared to only forty percent from citizens. Id. Further, in a study of eleven
randomly selected rulemaking proceedings across three federal agencies,
66.7%–100% of the comments were submitted by corporations, public utilities, or
trade associations. Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making
Process: Who Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RSCH. &
THEORY 245, 251–53 (1998).
37. Yackee & Yackee, supra note 36, at 133.
38. Id. at 135 (“The implication of our empirical results is relatively clear: agencies
appear to alter final rules to suit the expressed desires of business commenters,
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Even when the public participates significantly in rulemaking,
agencies often ignore individual citizen comments. In an evaluation of
recent rulemakings in which agencies received extensive comments
from individual citizens, Professor Nina Mendelson found that “agencies generally appear[ed] to be impatient with and unresponsive to
value-focused commenting” and “very rarely appear[ed] to give [lay
comments] any significant weight.”39 Although the final rules noted
the extensive comments filed by public citizens, agencies “pass[ed]
over those comments lightly, saving detailed responses for more sophisticated or technical comments.”40 Agencies’ disregard for valuefocused public comments is particularly worrisome because “laypeople
nearly always raise concerns that are relevant to the agency’s legal
mandate.”41
Take just one example of this practice. In 2002, the National Park
Service (Park Service) embarked on a rulemaking that would permit
jet skis in certain areas of Assateague National Seashore.42 Of the
7,600 comments submitted, “7,264 support[ed] a complete ban on [jet
ski] use within the national seashore boundary. An additional 43 individuals support[ed] banning [jet ski] use within the entire National
Park System.”43 The final rule never addressed the overwhelming
number of comments opposing jet skis,44 even though the Park Service’s legal mandate gives it the discretion to engage in such an in-

39.

40.
41.

42.
43.
44.

but do not appear to alter rules to match the expressed preferences of other kinds
of interests.”).
Nina A. Mendelson, Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of E-Mail, 79 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1343, 1361–65, 1367 (2011). According to Professor MarianoFlorentino Cuéllar, “Agency staff frequently note whether a concern was raised
by few or many commenters, tabulate form letters separately, and imply that
they do not necessarily merit the sort of response that an individualized letter
does.” Cuéllar, supra note 24, at 422 n.39 (citing Concession Contracts, 65 Fed.
Reg. 20,630, 20,631 (Apr. 17, 2000) (indicating that the National Park Service did
not respond to duplicative comments)).
Mendelson, supra note 39, at 1363 (citing Cuéllar, supra note 24, at 433 n.39).
Cuéllar, supra note 24, at 414. It is worth noting that discretion is a problem for
all agencies since “no regulatory statute is free of gaps or ambiguities.” David J.
Arkush, Direct Republicanism in the Administrative Process, 81 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1458, 1466 (2013). As Professor David Arkush explained, “[T]he problem is
even greater under the broad statutory mandates that have rapidly become the
norm for modern administrative agencies.” Id. The upshot is that most public
comments—unsophisticated though they may be—are actually relevant to the
agency’s decision. Cuéllar, supra note 24, at 414.
See generally Mendelson, supra note 39, at 1364.
Assateague Island National Seashore, Personal Watercraft Use, 68 Fed. Reg.
32,371, 32,372 (May 30, 2003).
See id.; see also Mendelson, supra note 39, at 1364 n.118 (stating that although
the Park Service alleged it responded to comments regarding the environmental
assessment in the “Finding of No Significant Impact” section of the regulation, it
was unclear whether comments opposing jet skis were included in this category).
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quiry.45 Instead, the Park Service discussed technical issues,
including safety and crowding, that might arise from jet ski use.46 Ultimately, the Park Service allowed use of jet skis in the areas under
consideration.47
Although the Park Service’s decision can only be described as a
value choice regarding how we should treat and use our public lands,
this does not support the argument for plebiscitary regulation. Scholars have identified a number of problems with conducting rulemaking
in this fashion, including the ability of a small number of people to
generate large numbers of comments, thus skewing the reliability of
comments as a gauge of citizen values.48 Here, the agency effectively
sidelined public participation by justifying its decision on technocratic
grounds. This example does show why public values must be taken
seriously when agencies make political or ethical decisions, and that
notice and comment falls short of ensuring that agencies pay attention
to public values.
Some scholars argue that agencies give individual commenters
short shrift and pay closer attention to industry comments because
agencies have a “bureaucratic ethos”49—the tendency to see regulatory problems as primarily problems of technocratic analysis.50 Com45. 54 U.S.C. § 100751(a) (“The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as the Secretary considers necessary or proper for the use and management of System
units.”).
46. See Mendelson, supra note 39, at 1364.
47. 36 C.F.R. § 7.65(c) (2007).
48. Known as the “Chicago model of civic participation: ‘Vote early and often.’ ”
Cynthia R. Farina et al., Rulemaking vs. Democracy: Judging and Nudging Public Participation That Counts, 2 MICH. J. ENV’T & ADMIN. L. 123, 142 (2012) (citing Stuart W. Shulman, The Case Against Mass E-Mails: Perverse Incentives and
Low Quality Public Participation in U.S. Federal Rulemaking, 1 POL’Y & INTERNET 23, 35–36 (2009)). Another concern with plebiscitary rulemaking is that
commenters simply do not have the information necessary to make a nonarbitrary decision about the desirability of any given regulation. See id. at 143.
49. Bureaucratic ethos is defined as a focus on “values such as efficiency, efficacy,
expertise, loyalty, and hierarchy.” Nabatchi et al., supra note 6, at i35–i36.
50. “[A]gency officials may see themselves as operating in an atmosphere of rational,
technocratic analysis.” Mendelson, supra note 39, at 1371. This is due to a societal embrace of “management, experts, and the scientific method as rationalizing
and executive-centered forces” that generally tends “to turn political questions
into technical questions.” Durant & Ali, supra note 13, at 279. This tendency “still
resonates widely today.” Curtis Ventriss et al., Democracy, Public Administration, and Public Values in an Era of Estrangement, 2 PERSPS. ON PUB. MGMT. &
GOVERNANCE 275, 280 (2019). As Professor Nabatchi notes, “[P]olicy and decision
making have been increasingly dominated [by] technocrats [and] experts who
generate and analyze statistical data at the expense of judgment, opinion, and
understanding.” Tina Nabatchi, Addressing the Citizenship and Democracy Deficits: The Potential of Deliberative Democracy for Public Administration, 40 AM.
REV. PUB. ADMIN. 376, 382 (2010) (citing DANIEL YANKELOVICH, COMING TO PUBLIC JUDGMENT: MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK IN A COMPLEX WORLD (1991)).
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ments from ordinary citizens often express simple value judgements
but offer no sophisticated legal, scientific, or technical information.51
Through this lens, a quantitative and qualitative comparison between
industry and public engagement leads to the assumption that citizens
are apathetic and unsophisticated, which circularly “lend[s] credence
to accounts emphasizing the technical and scientific dimensions of
regulatory problems, not political or ethical ones.”52 This is fortified
by the further assumption that were the public to have the knowledge,
skill, and professionalism of the regulators, they would come to the
same, or a similar, conclusion.53 But by casting regulatory problems
as solvable by politically neutral technocratic analysis, agencies discount ordinary public participation “as inconsistent with a notion of
rulemaking as a ‘technocratically rational’ enterprise.”54
Agencies also have a political incentive to recast value judgments
as questions of technocratic government. Agencies may engage in this
kind of reframing in order to “conceal the underlying social compromise . . . under the veneer of scientific truth.”55 Reformulating regulatory problems in this way may help agencies sustain legitimacy by
masking the subjectivity of the regulatory endeavor.56 Some commentators have surmised that justifying agency action with purportedly
objective technocratic measures, like cost–benefit analysis, may also
gain support with the public because it appears to limit the exercise of
agency discretion.57 Since rationality is assumed to be an internal
constraint on discretion,58 the public’s fear of unaccountable agency
staff making discretionary decisions is assuaged when officials are
purportedly bound by a technocratic (i.e., rational) process that results
51. See Cuéllar, supra note 24, at 426.
52. Id.
53. See Farina et al., supra note 48, at 143. “Would mass public commenters maintain the same preferences were they to have more complete information about the
facts, the variety of competing interests and values, and the range of regulatory
outcomes the agency might adopt short of either banning the activity completely
or leaving it entirely unregulated?” Id. Studies show that “reasonably full and
balanced information about complex policy questions can change citizens’ policy
preferences,” though not invariably. Id. at 143–44 (describing several studies
demonstrating this shift).
54. Mendelson, supra note 39, at 1346.
55. Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 1613, 1653 (1995).
56. See id. at 1654 n.142; Sidney A. Shapiro & Christopher H. Schroeder, Beyond
Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Pragmatic Reorientation, 32 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 433,
467 (2008); Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97
HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1292–93 (1984) (“This rhetoric can assure its advocates and
their audience of the legitimacy of bureaucratic power only as long as its manipulability is concealed.”).
57. See Wagner, supra note 55, at 1654 & n.142.
58. See Frug, supra note 56, at 1322–23.
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in politically neutral, legitimate exercises of expertise.59 Though the
public may believe that this expert-driven process keeps
“[s]ubjectivity, personal bias, or private judgment or opinion” at bay,60
in reality, this framing only obscures the discretionary, subjective
value choices at the heart of most regulatory decisions.61 The imposition of cost–benefit analysis on so-called significant agency regulations62 can be understood in part as a quest to publicly limit agency
discretion through technocratic means and ultimately bolster the legitimacy of regulations.63
Supporting decisions with complex technical reasoning has the added effect of shielding agency decisions from “unwanted review” by
nonexperts.64 Those with an economic stake in the outcome of the
59. See Wagner, supra note 55, at 1667.
60. Shapiro & Schroeder, supra note 56, at 467. “It is even better if [rules limiting the
exercise of discretion] can be rules of quantification, which by resemblance can
borrow on the esteem in which most people hold science. . . . ‘Quantification is
raised up as a neutral, objective language, a basis for minimizing arbitrariness,
and hence for overcoming suspicion and winning allies.’ ” Id. (quoting Theodore
M. Porter, Objectivity as Standardization: The Rhetoric of Impersonality in Measurement, Statistics, and Cost-Benefit Analysis, in RETHINKING OBJECTIVITY 197,
210 (Allan Megill ed., 1994)).
61. See Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5
YALE J. ON REGUL. 89, 93–94 (1988)); Wagner, supra note 55, at 1653–54.
62. Review by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within the
Executive Office of the President (EOP) is limited to “significant regulatory action.” Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,738 (Sept. 30, 1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 101–05 (2019). Significant
regulatory action means any regulatory action that may (1) “have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect in a material way
the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities;” (2) create inconsistencies with other regulations; (3) “materially alter the
budgetary impacts of entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan programs or the
rights and obligations of recipients thereof;” or (4) raise novel issues of law or
policy. Id. Significant regulatory actions must be accompanied by extensive
cost–benefit analysis. Id. at 51,740–41. OIRA reviews the cost–benefit analysis to
determine if the rule’s benefits justify its costs. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed.
Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 115–16 (2019). Some
scholars have criticized OIRA’s determination of which rules to review as “baffling.” See Lisa Heinzerling, Inside EPA: A Former Insider’s Reflections on the
Relationship Between the Obama EPA and the Obama White House, 31 PACE
ENV’T L. REV. 325, 347 (2014) (noting that most of the rules reviewed by OIRA
during the Obama Administration were not economically significant, and instead
OIRA reviewed only the rules it wanted to and often for arbitrary reasons).
63. See Wagner, supra note 55, at 1653–54. “[T]he concept of ‘expertise’ could be invoked to suggest the possibility of an organization that constrains the exercise of
subjective discretion within the bounds of professional objectivity.” Frug, supra
note 56, at 1293.
64. Wendy E. Wagner, A Place for Agency Expertise: Reconciling Agency Expertise
with Presidential Power, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2019, 2032 (2015); see also Jennifer
Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1755,
1771 (2013) (stating that agencies strategically increase the cost of review, mak-
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rulemaking, however, can use the technical and scientific focus of the
agency’s public reasoning—and their access to paid experts—to flood
the agency with information and analyses that the agency ignores at
its peril.65 The studies mentioned above make plain that the participation of regulated industries armed with legal and technical experts
has a quantifiable effect on the content of regulations, whereas public
participation does not.66
Because agencies have construed their role in technocratic terms,
the notice and comment process in large part has failed to engage the
public in the regulatory process and given economic and political elites
enormous influence over policy decisions. Nevertheless, agencies are
not the only institutional actor to blame for their bureaucratic ethos.
The judiciary plays an important role in pushing agencies to offer
technocratic justifications for regulations.
B.

The Judiciary’s Role in Promoting Technical
Justifications for Agency Rulemaking

The judiciary has played a pivotal role in encouraging agencies to
prioritize the technocratic aspects of rulemaking.67 The advent of
“hard look” review of agency actions has led to courts’ expectation that
agencies justify regulations with technocratic rationality.68 To avoid
reversal on appeal, agencies have an incentive to address the volumes
of scientific or technical information—provided more often than not by
regulated industries—for fear that a reviewing court will secondguess agency reasoning based on outside information. This section discusses selected administrative law cases to show how the judiciary’s
hard look arbitrary and capricious review jurisprudence has pressed
agencies to address the technical aspects of rulemaking and ignore or
bury the political value choices that often lie at the heart of
rulemaking.
In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Auto
Insurance Co., the Supreme Court engaged in a searching review in

65.
66.
67.
68.

ing review more difficult and insulating their decisions); Watts, supra note 22, at
40 (noting the incentive to hide political influence behind technocratic terms).
See Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1324–25 (2010). This phenomenon is referred to as “information capture.” Id. at 1325.
See supra notes 29–41 and accompanying text.
See Watts, supra note 22, at 84.
Agencies are expected to produce data-driven cost and risk analyses,
to identify the facts they consider relevant and entertain claims that
these facts are wrong or incomplete, to assess alternative approaches, to
respond to questions and criticism, and to explain why their proposed
solutions are the best choices within the bounds of what their statutory
authority says they can, must, or may not consider.
Farina et al., supra note 48, at 135.
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determining whether the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s (NHTSA) rescission of a rule requiring certain cars to be
equipped with either airbags or automatic seatbelts was proper.69
Stating that under the arbitrary and capricious standard, an agency
“must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action,”70 the Court focused almost entirely on the technocratic justifications that the NHTSA used to justify its decision.71
Ultimately, the Court found that the NHTSA failed to fully analyze
and adequately explain the revocation of the restraint standards.72
With this decision, the Supreme Court ushered in the hard look standard—a data-driven test for agency rules.73 Under this standard,
courts must compare the decision to the available data to ensure that
the agency has not “offered an explanation for its decision that runs
counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it
could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise.”74
Nevertheless, the Court also described this review as “narrow” and
cautioned that courts should not substitute their judgment for that of
the agency.75 In contrast to State Farm, Baltimore Gas and Electric
Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. is a prime example of
the way courts can dial down their review to a “soft review.”76 In upholding the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s rule regulating the environmental effects of a nuclear power plant’s fuel cycle, the Court
declared: “It is not our task to determine what decision we, as Commissioners, would have reached. Our only task is to determine
whether the Commission has considered the relevant factors and articulated a rational connection between the facts found and the choice

69. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 34–39
(1983).
70. Id. at 43.
71. Id. at 51–57.
72. Id. at 57.
73. Kagan, supra note 8, at 2372.
74. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.
75. Id. (“We will, however, ‘uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s
path may reasonably be discerned.’ ” (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. ArkansasBest Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974))).
76. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983);
see also Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and
Judicial Review as Translation of Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 736–37
(2011) (stating that super deference is “sometimes noted for the role it plays in
judicial vacillation between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ review”).
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made.”77 Some commentators have deemed this kind of soft review of
agency science “super deference.”78
While there is some debate around whether super deference accurately describes how courts approach agency decision-making,79 there
seems to be little debate that the arbitrary and capricious review standard is malleable “based on [the court’s] assessment of contextual factors in a particular case.”80 There are, of course, no clear lines
between expertise and policy judgments or between policy judgments
and politics.81 Courts are left to muddle through the task of drawing
lines between appropriate exercises of policy judgment and inappropriate political influence. State Farm gave courts the latitude to “dial
their scrutiny up and down,”82 but hard look review is not required, as
shown in Baltimore Gas. Consequently, agencies can only guess how
a court would review a regulation if it were challenged, and therefore
it behooves agencies to produce a voluminous record of scientifically
77. Baltimore Gas, 462 U.S. at 105 (first citing Bowman Transp., 419 U.S. at 285–86;
then citing Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971)). The
NRDC challenged the rule because the agency did not consider health, cumulative, and socioeconomic effects, but the Court determined that it was not arbitrary and capricious for the agency to set a net value based on generic costs and
benefits for use in individual proceedings where case-specific information would
be considered as well. Id. at 93, 101–04.
78. Meazell, supra note 76, at 733.
79. Compare Carla Mattix & Kathleen Becker, Scientific Uncertainty Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1125, 1158 (2002) (arguing
that super deference is a part of arbitrary and capricious review), with Meazell,
supra note 76, at 738 (arguing that courts are moving “away from super deference toward hard-look review”).
80. Gillian E. Metzger, The Roberts Court and Administrative Law, 2019 SUP. CT.
REV. 1, 35 (2019). This flexibility causes “significant unpredictability in the applicable standard of review.” Wagner, supra note 65, at 1359–60 (citing JERRY L.
MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE
PUBLIC LAW 181 (1999); see also Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of
Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 411 (1987) (“The
Court has vacillated over the degree of deference to be accorded agency decisions
under the APA.”).
81. See Holly Doremus, Science Plays Defense: Natural Resources Management in the
Bush Administration, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 249, 290 (2005) (“Political choices cannot
be removed from the process [of administrative decision-making].”); Thomas O.
McGarity, Our Science Is Sound Science and Their Science Is Junk Science: Science-Based Strategies for Avoiding Accountability and Responsibility for RiskProducing Products and Activities, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 897, 932 (2004) (“[P]olicy
nearly always drives the inferences that an expert draws from scientific studies.”); Shannon Roesler, Agency Reasons at the Intersection of Expertise and Presidential Preferences, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 491, 513 (2019) (“Both the presidentialcontrol and expertise models of agency decisionmaking rely on traditional conceptions of rationality that assume technical judgments can be separated from political judgments.”).
82. Metzger, supra note 80.
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and technically framed justifications for every component of a rule to
stave off or defend against challenges.83
These two approaches were on display more recently in dueling
opinions by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Breyer in Department of
Commerce v. New York after New York challenged the decision to add
a citizenship question to the 2020 census.84 According to the majority
opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the decision to include a
citizenship question was ultimately left to the Secretary of Commerce
by statute, though that decision was informed by the technical analysis provided by the Census Bureau.85 The Secretary thus had the discretion to determine that the Census Bureau’s analysis of whether
inclusion would depress response rates was inconclusive.86 Chief Justice Roberts also wrote that the Court should not privilege the Census
Bureau’s expertise and data modeling “as touchstones of substantive
reasonableness” over the Secretary’s discretion to consider the Bureau’s evidence along with other “incommensurables under conditions
of uncertainty.”87
In contrast, Justice Breyer’s dissent meticulously reviewed the
multiple Census Bureau analyses of response rates to determine that
it was unreasonable for the Secretary to include the question when the
experts at the Census Bureau recommended that the question be left
out.88 Justice Breyer’s dissent characterized the decision as almost entirely one of technocratic analysis,89 while Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion cast it as primarily one of policy and discretion delegated to the
Secretary by Congress.90 Both opinions, no less, claimed they were
straightforwardly applying the arbitrary and capricious review standard set out in State Farm.91 And both have a good claim to being
right. Though Justice Breyer’s dissent is more in line with the Court’s
searching review in the State Farm case itself,92 in general the Supreme Court’s arbitrary and capricious review is less searching than
often acknowledged.93 As the different approaches of Chief Justice
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See Wagner, supra note 65, at 1359–60.
Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019).
Id. at 2561.
Id. at 2571.
Id. The Court ultimately remanded the decision back to the agency because although the Court found the Secretary’s decision objectively reasonable, his reasons for that decision were a pretext. Id. at 2575–76.
Id. at 2584, 2587–93 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
Id. at 2568–69 (majority opinion).
See id. at 2567–68; id. at 2585 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983).
See Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin Rationality Review, 114 MICH. L.
REV. 1355, 1358–59 (2016).
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Roberts and Justice Breyer demonstrate, questions susceptible to being posed in scientific terms, such as whether to include a citizenship
question on the census, are inevitably shot through with questions of
policy.94 Neatly separating the two is an impossible task, leaving
courts with plenty of latitude to frame the issue before them.95
The broader point here, however, is that while courts certainly recognize that partisan politics play a role in agency decisions and that
some statutes leave the ultimate choice up to policymakers, it is not
always clear when a court will conduct a searching, meticulous review
of the agency’s decision or characterize the decision as a policy judgment sufficiently informed by expert analysis. Relatedly, courts are
uncomfortable when politics appear to play too overt a role in agency
decisions,96 as appears to be the case in Department of Commerce.97
As a result, agencies have an incentive to conceal value judgments
behind scientific or technical justifications for all rules because of the
unpredictability of the application of the arbitrary and capricious
standard. Professor Jerry Mashaw likens the courts to “robed roulette
wheels churning out results—either ‘case dismissed’ or ‘remanded to
the agency for further development’—in a fashion that approximate[s]
chance.”98 If the agency draws a judge that engages in a hard look
review in the mold of State Farm or the dissent in Department of Commerce, the agency has no chance to win if it has not stocked its reasoning with technical analysis.99 Even if the reviewing court conducts a
soft look review, as in Baltimore Gas or Department of Commerce, construing the regulated problem as complex and technical can only help
the agency avoid scrutiny, whereas revealing political considerations
can lead to reversal.100 Judicial review simply adds another reason for
agencies to conceal important value judgments that drive agency regulations under the “unassailable mantle of science.”101
94. Examples of these types of questions include the biological effects of very lowdose contaminant exposures, the probability of extremely improbable events, the
judgment that must be used to make decisions when thorough data is unavailable, and the value choices between different types of science.
95. Meazell, supra note 76, at 746 (noting that policy choices “cannot be avoided” in
scientific inquiry).
96. See Watts, supra note 22, at 42–43 (“[H]ard look review currently incentivizes
agencies to disclose only certain decisionmaking factors—scientific, technical, or
statutory factors—that are likely to gain judicial approval.”).
97. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2574–76 (refusing to ignore the inconsistency between the agency’s action and its explanation).
98. MASHAW, supra note 80, at 181; see also Bressman, supra note 22, at 485 (calling
judicial review a “moving target”).
99. See Wagner, supra note 65, at 1360.
100. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533–35 (2007) (remanding to the
EPA its decision not to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from cars due, in part,
to its reliance on policy considerations).
101. Meazell, supra note 76, at 736.
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Agencies, accordingly, have little political or legal incentive to seek
out and take seriously the values of the general public. In the end,
most people have no opportunity to participate in the bulk of decisions
that their own government makes. As Michael Lind recently put it,
“[C]asting votes is like putting coins into a broken vending machine.
When there is no response, frustrated people tend to kick the machine.”102 It is no wonder, then, that there is frustration with the lack
of access to agency decision-making processes where (unlike elections)
there is no obvious way for ordinary citizens to influence the substance of national policy. The vending machine of the administrative
state, to extend Michael Lind’s colorful metaphor, is not just broken—
it isn’t designed to accept the coins inserted. The commonly held notion of political engagement with the administrative state through individual comments does not fit comfortably with conflicting notions
about the value of neutral and objective regulation expected by the
courts and practiced within agencies. The flawed, but powerfully attractive, philosophical underpinnings of this tension is the focus of the
next Part.
III. “THE RULE OF NOBODY”: THE PROCEDURAL REPUBLIC
AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Over twenty years ago, Michael Sandel argued that the lack of
faith in the legitimacy of American government institutions was the
product of a liberal “public philosophy” that manifested itself in what
Sandel called the procedural republic.103 The administrative state is,
at its core, an outgrowth of this procedural republic and has assumed
its delegitimizing features, which contribute to antiestablishment and
populist movements. This Part will explore the philosophical connections between the modern liberal account of government and technocratic administration.
A.

The Neutrality of the Liberal State

The liberal public philosophy with which Sandel was concerned
holds that government should be neutral among moral claims, relegating foundational moral questions to personal conviction.104 Government neutrality, the argument goes, is necessary to respect the moral
agency of each individual.105 Rather than providing the forum for the
102. Michael Lind, Saving Democracy from the Managerial Elite, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 10,
2020, 11:15 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/saving-democracy-from-the-managerial-elite-11578672945?mod=HP_listc_pos4.
103. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC
PHILOSOPHY 4 (1996).
104. Id. at 12.
105. Michael J. Sandel, The Political Theory of the Procedural Republic, 93 REVUE DE
MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE 57, 67 (1988).
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development of the character of its citizens, government exists to secure a neutral framework of rights and procedures so that people can
exercise their moral agency to choose their own ends. In the procedural republic, people are “freely choosing, individual selves.”106 Consequently, the moral constraints of family, religion, or country have no
claim on the morality of the ends chosen by any individual, and thus
cannot be a legitimate basis for regulation by the state. “Freed from
the dictates of nature and the sanction of social roles, the human subject is installed as sovereign, cast as the author of the only moral
meanings there are.”107 Thus, the only moral imperative for government is to ensure that the right to choose one’s own ends is preserved
by neutral procedures.108 Government should, as it were, stay out of
the business of defining the common good.109 A commitment to the
procedural republic permits “politics and government [to] live[ ] side
by side, but touch[ ] almost nowhere.”110
In this way, however, the ideal of state neutrality “is not morally
self-sufficient but parasitic on a notion of community it officially rejects.”111 The very choice to deem individuals as the only rightful
claimants to their moral ends as an animating principle of government depends on the anterior assumption that we, as a political community, have already decided that government must respect the sole
moral autonomy of the individual. To be sure, this view is attractive as
the basis for government because it appears to be no choice at all.
Rather, it flows from pre-political rights that attach to individuals by
virtue of their existence. But the ideal of state neutrality is itself a
value judgment about the moral agency of the individual that, according to this liberal philosophy, each individual—as a citizen—should be
free to reject or accept. In a world in which the state must remain
neutral, however, individuals could never have chosen that value collectively as a governing principle because to do so would improperly
impose a particular morality on every citizen. The notion of state neutrality ineluctably trades on a moral commitment to a shared value
that denies the ability of the political community to act collectively to
106. Michael J. Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy, Keynote Address (1997), in 85 GEO. L.J. 2073, 2080 (1997) (but noting the
procedural republic may cause certain unwanted dependencies).
107. Michael J. Sandel, The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, 12 POL.
THEORY 81, 87 (1984). Liberalism conceives of “the individual as something given,
complete in itself, and of liberty as a ready-made possession of the individual,
only needing the removal of external restrictions in order to manifest itself.” John
Dewey, The Future of Liberalism, 32 J. PHIL. 225, 226 (1935).
108. See Sandel, supra note 105, at 60; see also SANDEL, supra note 103, at 12–13
(arguing the capacity to choose between competing values is essential).
109. See SANDEL, supra note 103, at 54.
110. KURT VONNEGUT, PLAYER PIANO 120 (The Dial Press 2006) (1952).
111. Sandel, supra note 107, at 91.
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affirm that commitment. The procedural republic, accordingly, exaggerates the extent of consensus on contested moral values.
The administrative state currently buys in to the liberal assumption that choosing neutrality (i.e., choosing to justify its actions on
technocratic rationality) is itself a neutral choice. By assuming the
valuelessness of liberal neutrality, the administrative state masks
values in neutrality and replicates the false assumption of consensus
on regulatory policy. The administrative state does not see a need for
the public to assert common values in regulations because it perceives
regulation as neutral, allowing individuals’ private ordering of their
own moral ends without disruption. In fact, public inclusion through
democratic control over regulatory policy is dangerous to individual
freedom because a value-neutral result cannot be guaranteed.112 The
state can—and indeed must—simply recede into the background as a
mechanism for aggregating individuals’ private values in search for a
neutral perspective from which to regulate.113 Hannah Arendt pointedly called this kind of government “the rule of nobody.”114 Paradoxically, the individual is lost in the commitment to neutrality, which
renders particular persons “abstract” and “outside of time.”115 And
unlike democratic politics, the administrative state acts as if it can
ensure neutrality, but there is little reason to see this assumption as
legitimate unless neutrality is first secured as the common public
value to guide all regulatory decisions.
112. See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 22, at 496, 498 (noting arbitrary government
threatens individual liberty, and that elected officials sometimes act in their own
self-interest); DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY 49–50 (2010) (noting the attractiveness of
a method of regulation that imposes no value judgment but perfectly aggregates
individual preferences because it is free of the “oppressive potential” of other
forms of political organization); see also Jedediah Britton-Purdy et al., Building a
Law-and-Political-Economy Framework: Beyond the Twentieth-Century Synthesis, 129 YALE L.J. 1784, 1813 (2020) (“The affirmative idea that a market order
secures an important form of the liberal value of neutrality interacts here with
the negative idea that any political judgments about which social interests to
secure or advance are likely to involve capture, entrenchment, and spurious
claims to a (probably non-existent) ‘public interest . . . .’ ”).
113. See KYSAR, supra note 112, at 45 (describing the search for an objective “view
from nowhere” from which to regulate).
114. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 45 (2d ed. 2018).
115. KATRINA FORRESTER, IN THE SHADOW OF JUSTICE: POSTWAR LIBERALISM AND THE
REMAKING OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 245 (2019) (discussing Judith Shklar’s critique of liberal philosophy in her seminal book Ordinary Vices); KYSAR, supra
note 112 (arguing that in the search for objective justifications for action, we lose
the particular individual moral reasons for acting). According to John Dewey, liberalism is an ahistorical philosophy “in which . . . particular ideas of individuality
and freedom were asserted to be absolute and eternal truths; good for all times
and all places.” Dewey, supra note 107.
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The Liberal Proceduralist Administrative State

The liberal goal of state neutrality manifests itself in each regulatory decision. The administrative state’s commitment to technocratic
rationality as the justification for agency actions only conceals what
are, in reality, value-laden decisions.116 Pursuit of the appearance of
neutrality in the administrative state is a form of this same public
philosophy Sandel identified as the source of discontent in the current
political arrangement.117 Regulating on the basis of the public’s moral
judgment is out of the question because it would impose the moral
judgment of others on individuals who may not share it. On the other
hand, justifying regulatory action on objective facts and rational analysis appears to ensure that decisions made by the administrative state
do not interfere with an individual’s ability to choose their own ends.
The administrative state cannot infringe upon the ability of an individual to choose their own moral ends because no one can deny the
objective state of the world.118
Nonetheless, any rational, technocratic means–ends methodology
is a social construction that is “neither objective nor unbiased.”119 The
pervasive use of market-oriented methods, like cost–benefit analysis,
to set regulatory policy is a prime modern example of the attempt to
maintain state neutrality. Market-oriented regulations use price signals from real markets or, where no relevant market exists, create
artificial markets by surveying and aggregating private price preferences to select regulations. For proponents of market-oriented regulation, “the market proves a unique site in which to determine and
achieve social good in liberal societies: the consenting individual is the
author of the norms under which she will live . . . . without requiring
anyone to consent to a comprehensive account of the social good.”120
116. See Farina et al., supra note 48, at 131–32 (“Increasingly, we recognize that regulatory decisions are heavily value-laden, even when they also require deployment
of scientific or other specialized knowledge.”); Nabatchi, supra note 50; Meazell,
supra note 76, at 736; Sidney Shapiro & Richard Murphy, Public Participation
Without a Public: The Challenge for Administrative Policymaking, 78 MO. L. REV.
489, 495 (2013) (“Administrative policymaking demands that agencies make
value choices, and in a democracy, the agency should be politically accountable
for its choices.”).
117. See SANDEL, supra note 103, at 4–7.
118. Cf. HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE: EIGHT EXERCISES IN POLITICAL
THOUGHT 141 (Penguin Books 2006) (1961) (“For to live in a political realm with
neither authority nor the concomitant awareness that the source of authority
transcends power and those who are in power, means to be confronted anew,
without the religious trust in a sacred beginning and without the protection of
traditional and therefore self-evident standards of behavior, by the elementary
problems of human living-together.”).
119. Shapiro & Schroeder, supra note 56, at 446.
120. Britton-Purdy et al., supra note 112, at 1814–15. Elizabeth Anderson has similarly argued that “unlaundered private preferences are not the best input into
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Cost–benefit analysis, however, is not neutral because “[i]t expresse[s]
a particular view of power and legitimacy”121 and necessarily incorporates certain moral assumptions that are often not publicly acknowledged.122 Cost–benefit analysis rests on the questionable assumption
that costs and benefits are commensurable and monetizable—that is,
that they can be measured accurately in the same units: dollars and
cents.123 Yet it is controversial on moral grounds to place an explicit
dollar value on the things we value for nonmonetary reasons—for example, the continued existence of a particular species,124 the value of
a human life,125 or a society free of discrimination.126 The attempt to
assign value in a purportedly scientifically objective way for a
cost–benefit analysis “avoid[s] engagement with the fundamental
questions of value that are necessarily implied in political judgments
about what should count as ‘costs’ and ‘benefits.’ ”127 Replacing political judgment with scientific rationality threatens to flatten individual
liberty by smuggling in values that end up animating regulation.128
Cost–benefit analysis exemplifies the broader problem of the pervasive “trans-scientific” issues agencies are asked to address.129 A
trans-scientific issue is one that can be asked in scientific terms but
cannot be truly addressed by science because its answer necessarily

121.
122.
123.

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

democratic decision-making, precisely because . . . they do not constitute a public
interest, even in aggregate.” Elizabeth Anderson, The Epistemology of Democracy, 3 EPISTEME 8, 11 (2006).
Britton-Purdy et al., supra note 112, at 1806.
See Roesler, supra note 81, at 520–22.
Michael J. Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets, Address at Brasenose College for the Tanner Lectures on Human Values (May
11–12, 1998), in Lecture Library, TANNER LECTURES, https://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_resources/documents/a-to-z/s/sandel00.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7NYZ-QUZJ] (last visited Aug. 27, 2021); see also Frank Ackerman & Lisa
Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1557–59 (2002) (discussing how cost–benefit analysis monetizes the protection of the environment and problematically attaches
price tags to priceless things); Amartya Sen, The Discipline of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 931, 948 (2000) (arguing that equating market-centered
contingent valuations for the preservation of the environment to a private commodity that can be purchased disregards important social choice options).
E.g., KYSAR, supra note 112, at 213–14 (discussing the EPA’s attempt to place a
monetary value on fish and other organisms that would be killed by being sucked
into cooling water intakes at power plants across the country).
E.g., Reeve T. Bull, Making the Administrative State “Safe for Democracy”: A Theoretical and Practical Analysis of Citizen Participation in Agency Decisionmaking, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 611, 615 (2013).
E.g., Lisa Heinzerling, Quality Control: A Reply to Professor Sunstein, 102 CALIF.
L. REV. 1457, 1464 (2014).
Britton-Purdy et al., supra note 112, at 1805.
ARENDT, supra note 114. Arendt argues that social and behavioral sciences “aim
to reduce man as a whole, in all his activities, to the level of a conditioned and
behaving animal.” Id.
Roesler, supra note 81, at 521 (citing Wagner, supra note 55, at 1629).
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rests on value judgments.130 The question of how much ozone is safe
can be posed, evaluated, and purportedly solved in scientific terms.
But the underlying risk assessment, i.e., what level of safety is acceptable, cannot be answered by any scientific inquiry. That the Obama
EPA could set an ozone standard that the Bush EPA rejected, based
on the same administrative record, highlights the inherently valueladen choice at the center of many regulatory decisions.131 The scientific justifications for both standards only mask, but do not replace,
the underlying value choices.132 No matter what the state of the world
is—something expert analysis may be able to tell us accurately—it
cannot tell us what to do about it.133 Decisions among possible regulatory actions differ as much on moral or ideological grounds as they do
on matters of factual and technical expertise, even if agencies and
courts only acknowledge the latter.134
In this account of the administrative state, public comment procedures are the obverse of the neutral state. The opportunity to comment recognizes the freely choosing individual’s procedural right to
participate. The right to participate, however, is necessarily limited by
the commitment to neutrality. Participation can never be allowed to
affect the substance of policy except in highly limited ways that formally respect the rationality of the decision. As such, participation
must be limited to providing inputs (facts, technical data, etc.) required for the neutral decision-making process. “But of course, in modern society every particular individual is weak and in no position to
demand rights or recognition.”135 Without the financial ability to hire
experts, or the political clout to influence the President or their political appointees, individuals are left with only a hollow procedural
130. See Alvin M. Weinberg, Science and Trans-Science, 10 MINERVA 209, 209–13
(1972).
131. See generally Thomas O. McGarity, Science and Policy in Setting National Ambient Air Quality Standards: Resolving the Ozone Enigma, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1783
(2015) (describing the administrative record and noting the difference in
rulemaking outcomes between the Bush Administration and the Obama
Administration).
132. See id. at 1798. Professor McGarity notes that sometimes value choices are embedded so deeply in the agency’s scientific assessment that it is difficult for observers to determine which values the agency is basing its decision on. Id.
133. See, e.g., BERTRAND RUSSELL, HUMAN SOCIETY IN ETHICS AND POLITICS 3–4 (1955).
“[E]thics is bound up with life, not as a physical process to be studied by the
biochemist, but as made up of happiness and sorrow, hope and fear, and the other
cognate pairs of opposites that make us prefer one sort of world to another.” Id. at
4.
134. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 107–08 (3d
ed. 2007).
135. John Ferejohn, Two Views of the City: Republicanism and Law, in REPUBLICAN
DEMOCRACY: LIBERTY, LAW AND POLITICS 128, 149 (Andreas Niederberger & Philipp Schink eds., 2013).
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right, while political and economic elites contest the substance of regulatory policy.136
C.

The Liberal Proceduralist Administrative State Fosters
Anti-Establishment Politics

As the empirical studies cited in Part I demonstrate, expert participation on behalf of business interests shapes the substance of regulation in favor of those interests.137 Pursuit of technocratic rationality,
often in the form of market-oriented regulations, “has reinforced a
very non-neutral drift toward elite control of government, increasingly
described by political scientists as ‘oligarchy.’ ”138 Indeed, justifying
regulation on technocratic grounds may make agencies uniquely susceptible to industry manipulation because the methodologies used are
highly complex, superficially objective, and fact-intensive.139 Outside
experts hired by private interests can provide data or technical analyses that advance their own agenda in a way that is far from transparent.140 This state of affairs is possible precisely because agencies—
regardless of how they actually make decisions—publicly justify their
actions by resort to a bureaucratic ethos, thereby ensuring that the
public cannot compete within the constraints of bureaucratic rationality, while private interests can.
Professor Yascha Mounk labels this problem “undemocratic liberalism,” which describes a regime wherein formal rights are respected
and even cherished, but the vast majority of decisions are not subject
to democratic control.141 Mounk notes that the United States’ “commitment to liberal rights remains deeply ingrained. But the form this
liberalism takes is increasingly undemocratic.”142 Important decisions
are made by bureaucrats or judges largely insulated from political
136. See Shapiro & Murphy, supra note 116, at 497; Barron & Kagan, supra note 28
(arguing that notice and comment “tends to promote a conception of the regulatory process as a forum for competition among interest groups, rather than as a
means to further the public interest”); Mendelson, supra note 39, at 1371 (explaining that comments discussing value judgments receive less attention because agencies are hyper-focused on technocratic analysis); see also supra notes
24–46 and accompanying text (asserting that generally the political and economic
elites are the only members of society to truly influence and alter regulatory
policy).
137. See supra Part I.
138. Britton-Purdy et al., supra note 112, at 1823–24.
139. See Shapiro & Schroeder, supra note 56, at 495. The more technical the issues in
a rulemaking, the more likely well-funded interests will participate in information capture. Wagner, supra note 65, at 1325.
140. See Shapiro & Schroeder, supra note 56, at 495.
141. See generally YASCHA MOUNK, THE PEOPLE VS. DEMOCRACY: WHY OUR FREEDOM IS
IN DANGER AND HOW TO SAVE IT 53–98 (2018).
142. Id. at 92.
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control.143 The administrative state is an undemocratic liberal regime
that is far more responsive to economic and political elites, preventing
the public from informing the agency of its conception of the common
good. “Even though debates about proposed laws seemingly retain significance, an unfair policy making process gives ruling elites a huge
advantage in advancing their own interests.”144 By “unfair,” Mounk
means a policy process that gives undue access and influence to economic or political elites such that policy is skewed in their favor.145
On Mounk’s account, ordinary citizens find this state of affairs
intolerable.146
Unsurprisingly, political scientists have linked the exclusion of the
public from rulemaking to the estrangement and distrust citizens feel
toward government.147 Citizen estrangement has been further linked
to the balkanization or tribalization of American politics by denying
citizens a public forum to make collective decisions.148 Once it becomes clear that agencies are, in fact, making value judgments and
those value judgements are subject to intense private interest lobbying, the ground is primed for antiestablishment politicians to exploit
citizens left out of self-government.149
“[A]s the theory of cultural cognition teaches us, we can’t help but
draw on our cultural values to evaluate the impact policies will have
on the attainment of society’s secular ends,”150 and as Mounk suspects, burying the value choices made by regulators underneath a patina of neutrality contributes to the political outbursts we see today.151
Expecting those in power to justify public policy impartially cannot
make public officials actually impartial, “[i]t can only make them less
aware of the influence that our cultural commitments exert on their
143.
144.
145.
146.

147.

148.

149.
150.
151.

Id.
Id. at 93.
Id. at 92–93.
Id. at 35. Control of the administrative state by elites rather than the public “inspires a deep distrust in the political system that grows more corrosive with each
passing year.” Mounk, supra note 14.
See Durant & Ali, supra note 13. Citizens may become disengaged from the political process because they believe the system would not be responsive to their participation. Mounk, supra note 14, at 107; Mendelson, supra note 39, at 1373 (“[T]o
the extent members of the public perceive that the opportunities to participate
are not authentic, they may be deterred from engaging in the government
process.”).
Nabatchi, supra note 50, at 383 (first citing ROBERT J. SAMUELSON, THE GOOD
LIFE AND ITS DISCONTENTS: THE AMERICAN DREAM IN THE AGE OF ENTITLEMENT,
1945-1995, at 236 (1995); and then citing ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA: REFLECTIONS ON A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY 18 (1992)).
See MOUNK, supra note 141, at 34–35, 60–61, 94; Mounk, supra note 14, at 108.
MOUNK, supra note 141, at 144.
See Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 144–45
(2007).
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policy preferences.”152 The public, however, is cognizant of how values
influence policy, making “the smug insistence of their adversaries that
such policies reflect a neutral and objective commitment to the good of
all citizens” a particularly infuriating and disingenuous claim.153 It is
no wonder that appeals to facts, science, or cost–benefit analysis sway
few people to believe that any given regulatory policy is the right policy. Whatever the policy, it is broadly seen as the imposition of one set
of values over another at the hands of whatever group happens to control the levers of regulatory policy. Just as the procedural republic is
formally neutral but in fact inextricably bound up with value choices
that are no longer open to democratic deliberation and contestation, so
too is the administrative state.
IV. IF YOU DON’T LIKE THE WEATHER NOW, JUST WAIT A
FEW MINUTES: THE PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL
CONTROL THROUGH THE EXECUTIVE
With the fundamental flaw of the modern administrative state
squarely laid out, it becomes clear that reintroduction of politics to the
administrative state is an integral part of knitting the public and its
government back together. Before turning to what I argue should be
done to address the fundamental flaw laid out above, it is necessary to
confront the most obvious, but problematic, way to introduce politics
into administrative decisions—the President.
Advocates for returning administrative policy to political control
have argued that the President, as a nationally elected figure, is
uniquely positioned to impose public values on at least some important agency decisions.154 The President, after all, can be held accountable by voters for the policies emanating from their administration in
a way that courts and agency staff cannot.155 Proponents of this idea
argue that “[o]nce Congress relinquishes the power to determine the
152. Id.
153. Id. at 144–45.
154. See Kagan, supra note 8, at 2335. “[B]ecause the President has a national constituency, he is likely to consider, in setting the direction of administrative policy on
an ongoing basis, the preferences of the general public, rather than merely parochial interests.” Id.
Doubtless, the President’s willingness to take political responsibility,
even for generally popular rulemaking initiatives, reflects our growing
awareness and acceptance that rulemaking is not simply a technocratic
process performed in neutrality by objective experts; rulemaking has a
distinctly political cast, and that may make the President’s actions seem
even comforting.
Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965, 967 (1997);
see also Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling Presidential Control, 114 MICH. L. REV.
683, 715 (2016) (noting that President Obama’s public involvement with certain
regulatory initiatives increased political accountability of those policies).
155. See Kagan, supra note 8, at 2335; Strauss, supra note 154.
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details of regulatory policy, the President must assume it because the
Constitution permits no other option. . . . [T]he Constitution requires
an elected, focused governmental official to exercise that power rather
than a bunch of bureaucrats.”156
But tying the legitimacy of the administrative state to the electoral
accountability of the President poses a host of theoretical and practical problems that are as likely to erode legitimacy as they are to enhance political accountability. Responses to these well-known
shortcomings rely on the professionalism and technocratic rationality
of the bureaucracy to limit political influence that is deemed illegitimate, but those responses cannot avoid the intrinsic legitimacy
problems of technocratic rationality.157
There is little debate today that the modern Presidency exerts immense control over the administrative state. The President’s formal
control over the administrative state can take a number of forms: from
presidential directives commanding agencies to undertake certain regulatory actions, to review of regulations by the Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within the Executive Office of the President (EOP), to the President’s authority to fire political appointees.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly validated the President’s extensive control of the administrative state because the President is
uniquely accountable to the electorate.158 As multiple scholars have
pointed out, however, majoritarian accountability cannot do all the
work required to justify the President’s control.159 Consider that four
of the last eight presidential elections were won by a plurality of the
votes cast,160 and in both 2000 and 2016, the candidate who won received fewer votes than the candidate who lost.161 The majoritarian
argument for presidential control simply breaks down when Presidents can, and do, get elected without securing a majority of votes.
Even more troublesome for supporters of presidential control is
that, once in office, Presidents may have a greater incentive to please
their political contributors and allies than to appeal to the majority of
156. Bressman, supra note 22, at 489.
157. See supra Parts I–II.
158. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 513–14
(2010); Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2191–92
(2020).
159. See Bressman, supra note 22, at 466, 493–95 (collecting sources) (arguing that
constitutional scholars question whether majoritarianism best explains the structure of the Constitution).
160. The winning candidate was elected by a plurality of votes cast in the 1992, 1996,
2000, and 2016 presidential elections. See The American Presidency Project: Statistics, U.C. SANTA BARBRA, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/statistics/elections/
2016 [https://perma.cc/M3LA-X5WZ] (last visited July 13, 2021).
161. See id.
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Americans.162 In today’s polarized political landscape, playing to one’s
base is often a better electoral strategy than appealing to a wider audience.163 Presidential candidates also have financial incentives to appeal to individuals in their base due to their increased reliance on
individual donors, who are more likely to be partisan.164
The problems with presidential administration have become
starkly evident in the policy gyrations across the last four presidential
administrations.165 Climate change regulation is a good example. The
Bush Administration refused to regulate carbon dioxide under the
Clean Air Act, going so far as to tell the EPA that OIRA would not
even open the email containing the proposed rule meant to regulate
carbon dioxide.166 The Obama Administration reversed that stance by
first finding that carbon emissions threatened public health and welfare,167 and then issuing the Clean Power Plan and vehicle emissions
standards to curb greenhouse gas emissions.168 The Trump Administration repealed the Clean Power Plan and replaced it with the Affordable Clean Energy Rule, a much weaker regulation, and also repealed
162. Bressman, supra note 22, at 493 (citing DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY,
LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 21–24 (1991)).
163. See, e.g., Ronald Brownstein, Trump Settles on His Reelection Message, ATL.
(Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/03/trumps2020-strategy-double-down-his-base/584350/ [https://perma.cc/2W5X-LWVB] (arguing that President Trump’s reelection strategy will be to continue to appeal to
his most loyal supporters); Michael Tomasky, Biden’s Journey Left, N.Y. REV.
(July 2, 2020), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2020/07/02/joe-bidens-journeyleft/ [https://perma.cc/54TL-B3L3] (noting that Joe Biden’s presidential campaign
moved farther to the left to secure the democratic base in the general election).
164. See Richard H. Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, Political Fragmentation, and
the Decline of American Government, 124 YALE L.J. 804, 826–27 (2014).
165. See Kagan, supra note 8, at 2336; Watts, supra note 154, at 693; Strauss, supra
note 154; Sharece Thrower, Policy Disruption Through Regulatory Delay in the
Trump Administration, 48 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 517, 518–21 (2018) (listing a
number of directives issued by President Trump in various policy areas requiring
agency heads to delay, review, or rescind Obama-era regulations); Zeke Miller &
Aamer Madhani, On Day One, Biden Targets Trump Policies on Climate, Virus,
AP NEWS (Jan. 20, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-inauguration-dayone-d6637de1ce993d272108337c1030b79d [https://perma.cc/P2X8-TB27].
166. Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making,
108 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1153 (2010) (citing Felicity Barringer, White House Refused To Open Pollutants E-Mail, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2008), https://
www.nytimes.com/2008/06/25/washington/25epa.html [https://perma.cc/K2N3V83Z]).
167. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1).
168. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 60).
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the more stringent Obama-era vehicle emissions standards.169 States
and environmental groups challenged both repeals.170 The D.C. Circuit vacated and remanded the Affordable Clean Energy Rule back to
the EPA,171 while litigation surrounding the vehicle emissions standards is on pause until the Biden Administration decides whether to
rescind the Trump Administration rule.172 To borrow from Mark
Twain, presidential policy making looks a lot like New England
weather: if you don’t like it now, just wait a few minutes. Given these
shortcomings, it is difficult to maintain the argument that the President has anything but a coincidental incentive to consider national
preferences, the public interest, or the common good in regulatory
policy.173
Supporters of presidential control are not blind to these shortcomings. Recently, scholars have attempted to design ways to moderate
the President’s influence on the administrative state so that only legitimate political involvement is permitted.174 Disclosure of presidential
169. See Katherine McCormick, How Clean Is Clean?: An Analysis on the Difference
Between the Affordable Clean Energy Rule and the Clean Power Plan and Why
States Should Adhere to Stricter Emissions Standards, 37 PACE ENV’T L. REV.
103, 125 (2019) (“The finalized [Affordable Clean Energy] rule will do little to
decrease the United States’ contribution to worldwide emissions.”). Climate
change regulation is not the only area that has experienced wild policy swings
across administrations. Financial, healthcare, housing, and education policy have
all seen policy reversals from administration to administration. See Michael A.
Livermore & Daniel Richardson, Administrative Law in an Era of Partisan Volatility, 69 EMORY L.J. 1, 48–49 (2019); Thrower, supra note 165, at 521 (noting the
longstanding practice of freezing unpublished regulations at the beginning of a
new administration). President Biden has continued—and by some accounts even
expanded—the practice of undoing the regulatory agenda of a previous president
of a different political party. See Zachary B. Wolf, On Executive Actions, Biden Is
Blowing His Predecessors out of the Water, CNN (Feb. 8, 2021, 7:59 AM), https://
www.cnn.com/2021/02/06/politics/what-matters-february-5/index.html [https://
perma.cc/2HPE-S9VY].
170. See, e.g., Am. Lung Ass’n v. EPA, 985 F.3d 914 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (challenging the
Affordable Clean Energy Rule); Petition for Review, Union of Concerned Scientists v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin, No. 19-1230 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 28, 2019)
(challenging vehicle emissions standards).
171. Am. Lung Ass’n, 985 F.3d at 995.
172. Order, Union of Concerned Scientists, No. 19-1230 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 8, 2021). The
Biden Administration appears poised to resurrect some form of greenhouse gas
emission regulation. See Sabrina Shankman et al., Biden Signs Sweeping Orders
To Tackle Climate Change and Rollback Trump’s Anti-Environment Legacy, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Jan. 21, 2021), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/2101
2021/biden-executive-orders-climate-change/ [https://perma.cc/E6RW-2FN5].
173. See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 131, at 1785–98 (noting that the Obama Administration and the Bush Administration set two different ambient air quality standards based on the same administrative record and both standards were
reasonable).
174. See, e.g., Watts, supra note 154, at 726–45 (arguing that presidential influence in
rulemaking should be tethered to the statute at issue, raw political partisanship
should not be a permissible consideration, and presidential influence should be
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involvement175 and review by the judiciary have been touted as two
solutions to constrain inappropriate presidential interference with
agency regulations.176
A.

Disclosure of Presidential Involvement

Though modern presidents have made a show of publicly directing
agencies to carry out their political preferences,177 many regulatory
initiatives are carried out behind closed doors through the OIRA process,178 which hampers political accountability. Successive executive
orders have empowered OIRA to review proposed regulations deemed
“significant” or that raise novel legal or technical issues,179 and OIRA
review often prompts agencies to change or withdraw proposed
rules.180 The OIRA review process centralizes political power within
the EOP, giving the President and their staff control over regulatory

175.
176.
177.

178.
179.

180.

made transparent to reduce reliance on impermissible considerations); Mendelson, supra note 166, at 1163–65 (arguing that presidential influence on rulemaking should be disclosed to increase electoral accountability and reduce improper
political influence); Watts, supra note 22, at 83 (arguing for greater disclosure of
presidential influence in rulemaking, but suggesting that courts should police
whether presidential influence is legitimate or an exercise of raw partisanship);
Kagan, supra note 8, at 2351 (arguing that courts should constrain presidential
influence in areas not permitted by statute and that Congress should draw delegations narrowly if it does not want to give the President wide policy latitude).
For the purposes of this Article, presidential involvement is defined as including
involvement from staff of the EOP, which includes the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) and OIRA.
Mendelson, supra note 166, at 1159–66 (advocating for publicly disclosing presidential involvement).
See, e.g., Peter Nicholas & Ted Mann, Trump Highlights Record on Rolling Back
Obama Regulations, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 25, 2017, 8:14 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/trump-showcases-record-on-rolling-back-obama-regulations-1493163001
[https://perma.cc/3P3G-EC2P] (reporting that the Trump Administration drew
significant attention to its rollback of Obama-era regulations as an achievement
marker for President Trump’s first 100 days in office); Watts, supra note 154, at
692–706 (“Obama, however—taking a cue from Clinton—has also relied heavily
on overt command, trying to turn the regulatory state into an extension of his
own political agenda by frequently issuing written directives and publicly claiming ownership of regulatory policy.”).
See Watts, supra note 154, at 699 ; Mendelson, supra note 166, at 1151–54 (noting how Executive influence exerted through the OIRA review process can be
difficult to discern and providing examples).
See Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 62 (issued by President Clinton); David
M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 335, 364
(2006) (noting the Bush Administration’s use of President Clinton’s executive order regarding regulatory review); Exec. Order No. 13,563, supra note 62 (issued
by President Obama); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT REVOLUTION 20
(2018) (noting that President Trump retained President Obama’s executive order
imposing cost–benefit analysis).
See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 166, at 1151 (“[O]ver 90 percent of economically
significant rules underwent some change or withdrawal during the OIRA review
process.”).
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policy,181 but since OIRA reviews are rarely made public, such policy
priorities are obscured.182 OIRA’s interactions with and influence over
proposed rules are decidedly secretive and difficult to track183 and
have been criticized as political184 and byzantine.185
Scholars claim that disclosure would require the agency to publicly
declare and describe the interactions it had with the President or any
staff from the EOP in every rulemaking, thus revealing the effect of
the President’s political influence on the final regulation.186 More specifically, disclosure would reveal the influence of the President’s staff
(primarily, but not exclusively, OIRA) on proposed agency rules.187
Disclosure of these interactions would supposedly increase accountability by exposing to the public and Congress the value choices the
President prioritized in the regulation.
Scholars further argue that disclosure would constrain the President’s political influence over agencies by exposing, and thus deterring, any special treatment of parochial interests through the
manipulation of the agency’s technical analysis. This last point is premised on the assumption that the President would pay a political
price, rather than receive a political reward, for favoring special interests. But in today’s polarized political climate, it is not entirely clear
that this assumption is accurate. Whether disclosure alone could bolster electoral accountability given the current mechanics of presidential elections has also yet to be seen. Finally, an effective
congressional response to public disclosure of presidential influence is
unlikely to materialize because Congress would have to pass a bill
with a supermajority of both houses to overcome a likely presidential
veto.188
181. For a discussion of the OIRA review process, see supra note 62.
182. Mendelson, supra note 166, at 1157.
183. See id. Official records in the Bush Administration understated the influence of
OIRA on agency rulemakings. Id. at 1154. Further, there is little to no public
information about the Clinton Administration OIRA or the Obama Administration OIRA. Id.
184. See Daniel A. Faber et al., Reforming ‘Regulatory Reform’: A Progressive Framework for Agency Rulemaking in the Public Interest, 12 ADVANCE: J. ACS ISSUE
BRIEFS 3, 11 (2018) (finding that OIRA selects rules to review based on their “novelty or sensitivity,” which is often a political decision); see, e.g., Watts, supra note
154, at 699.
185. See, e.g., Heinzerling, supra note 62, at 342–44 (explaining that when submitting
a proposed regulation to OIRA for review, the EPA may not be able “to tell who
exactly was in charge of making the ultimate decision”); Cass R. Sunstein, The
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L.
REV. 1838, 1855 (2013) .
186. Mendelson, supra note 166, at 1163–66.
187. Id.
188. Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2320 (2006) (citing Terry M. Moe
& William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J.L. ECON.
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Judicial Review of Presidential Involvement

Judicial review, in addition to its traditional role of evaluating the
rationality of agency decision-making, would be enlisted to enforce
disclosure requirements and evaluate whether the political reasons
revealed through disclosure requirements are legitimate.189 As it
turns out, legitimate political influence is difficult to define. Professor
Kathryn Watts has advanced a somewhat nebulous definition that
designates political influence as legitimate if it reinforces “accountability, public participation, and representativeness.”190 Accordingly,
this definition likely rules out “[t]he President said so” as a reason,
but a statement that a given regulation “better aligns with the administration’s goals and comprehensive strategies” would pass muster.191
Surely only the politically inept would be unable to characterize a decision as something that fits within the administration’s view of the
public good. It is not clear what such an open-ended definition adds to
the already ambiguous definition of legitimacy. Professor Nina Mendelson, on the other hand, has argued that we should not define political legitimacy ex ante. Rather, disclosing political influence in
rulemaking will prompt a debate within the judiciary (and the public
at large) on what constitutes legitimate political influence.192
Regardless of how legitimate political influence is defined, asking
the judiciary to act as the legitimacy referee to the President’s political
priorities raises a host of problems. As a practical matter, courts are
often reluctant to pass judgment on the political priorities of Congress
and the President—the so-called political branches. Recall the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Department of Commerce. Even with
the issue of political influence squarely before the Court, the Court
scrupulously avoided passing judgment on the wisdom of the Secretary of Commerce’s political choices. Instead, the Court remanded the
decision to the Secretary on the grounds that the Secretary’s stated
reason was pretextual.193 Yet, there was nothing stopping the Court
from also passing judgment on the Secretary’s true political motiva-

189.
190.
191.

192.
193.

& ORG. 132 (1999)) (“The veto power thus becomes a tool to entrench presidential
decrees, rather than one that blocks congressional misadventures. And because
Congress ex ante appreciates the supermajority-override rule, its members do not
even bother to try to check the President, knowing that a small cadre of loyalists
in either House can block a bill.”).
Mendelson, supra note 166, at 1166; Kagan, supra note 8, at 2377.
Watts, supra note 22, at 83 (citing CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY 21 fig.1, 196–97 (1990)).
See Mendelson, supra note 166, at 1176 (arguing that justifying a regulatory policy as consistent with executive policy preferences is “more legitimate . . . because
[it is] less arbitrary than ‘[t]he President said so’ ”); Watts, supra note 22, at 73.
See Mendelson, supra note 166, at 1177.
Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575–76 (2019).
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tions. By choosing to stop short, the Court intentionally kept itself out
of a highly charged political dispute.194
There is good reason for the Court’s hesitation to become embroiled
in political disputes. Like agency staff, judges have no special claim to
deciding questions of values. They are neither political experts with a
greater understanding of the public interest or the common good nor
are they popular representatives.195 Though no one seriously believes
that judges call balls and strikes,196 as the now-famous phrase goes,
the judiciary’s ability to command popular support and the obedience
of the other branches is based in no small measure on the rickety
myth that courts really do take the law as they find it.197 To live in a
world where that “noble lie”198 no longer holds sway would be to live
in a world in which the conventional role of the judiciary in our constitutional structure would be uncertain at best.199 Just as agencies
have an incentive to portray their decisions as neutral and objective,
194. There are, of course, prominent examples of the Court wading into charged political issues. The decision in Bush v. Gore is the prime modern example. Bush v.
Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). Nevertheless, those decisions are likely to cause delegitimization of the Court in the eyes of the public. Many judges, Chief Justice Roberts among them, undoubtedly view cases like Bush v. Gore with some
trepidation. Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion in the political gerrymandering case Rucho v. Common Cause, wherein the Court held that political gerrymandering is a political question and thus nonjusticiable, is an example of this
wariness to involve the Court in highly charged political disputes. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506 (2019).
195. See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 74 (1996) (describing the “insight” of Supreme Court justices “into
. . . great issues” as “not spectacularly special”). At the same time, Dworkin was a
defender of judicial review, see Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 4: Political Equality, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 29 (1987) (arguing that judicial review is consistent with democracy and praising its ability to increase the accuracy of political
decisions), and argued that when judges fail to reach the “right” result, the losing
party has been treated unjustly, see Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1057, 1108 (1975).
196. Richard A. Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U. L.
REV. 1049, 1051 (2006) (“No serious person thinks that the rules that judges in
our system apply, particularly appellate judges and most particularly the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, are given to them the way the rules of baseball
are given to umpires. The rules are created by the judges themselves.”).
197. See MARTIN SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT: NEW APPROACHES TO POLITICAL JURISPRUDENCE 31 (1964) (noting the importance of “popular and professional expectations of ‘neutrality’ ” to the Supreme Court’s
“prestige”); see also Jason Iuliano, The Supreme Court’s Noble Lie, 51 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 911, 964–65 (2018) (“[T]he Justices operate at the grace of the people. In
the absence of broad public support, the Court is powerless to compel the President or Congress to abide by its rulings.”).
198. Iuliano, supra note 197, at 960–62 (comparing the Supreme Court’s maintenance
of the lie that justices apply the law mechanistically to Plato’s myth of the metals,
otherwise known as the noble lie).
199. See Harry T. Edwards, The Role of a Judge in Modern Society: Some Reflections
on Current Practice in Federal Appellate Litigation, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 385, 388
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the judiciary has ample reason to preserve the noble lie, even if few
take it literally. Seeking to preserve the myth likely entails a healthy
dose of judicial restraint in deciding nakedly political disputes.
Recent proposals that rely on judicial review to increase administrative accountability as a valuable check to presidential political influence must contend with the problems inherent in judicial review of
political priorities. In doing so, the proposals have failed to meaningfully distinguish themselves from the current arbitrary and capricious
review standard. Expanding on then-Professor Kagan’s position in her
seminal piece, Presidential Administration, Watts argues that if agencies publicly disclose presidential political priorities in the rulemaking
process, then courts should permit the agency to rely on those priorities200 in choosing among regulations that “the relevant statute, evidence, and science would support.”201 Thus, were an agency deciding
between two potential rules, both of which were aligned with statute
and existing evidence, the agency could consider the President’s stated
preference for one over the other.202 Under Watts’ proposal, a court
could credit consideration of the President’s political priorities as determinative and sustain the regulation on those grounds only when
science and evidence do not rule out particular courses of action—if
they ever could.203
For instance, both a decision to regulate greenhouse gas emissions
and a decision not to regulate such emissions appear to be within the
range of the current arbitrary and capricious review standard. The
former hypothetical falls squarely in the hard look category, placing
expert-driven analysis at the forefront of agency regulation. The latter
is more akin to the soft look embodied by the State Farm Court’s oftrepeated warning to courts not to substitute their judgment for that of
the agency.204 In both cases, the technical aspects of the agency’s decision play the primary role in either determining the content of the
regulation or measuring the ultimate policy choice against the
agency’s technical review.
Supporters of a more formalized role for the President’s political
priorities in agency rulemaking are caught between Scylla—vesting
too much power in the Executive—and Charybdis—subsuming politics to technocratic rationality. As in mythology, neither option is
palatable. The latter suffers all the problems that accompany a reli-

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

(1983) (“[A] surprisingly large number of people, both within and without the
legal community, question [judicial lawmaking’s] legitimacy in any form.”).
See Watts, supra note 22, at 32–33.
Id. at 72–73.
Id. (“[T]he agency should not be allowed to rely upon political considerations
alone . . . .”).
See id. at 73.
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983).
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ance on technocratic government, as explored in Parts I and II.205 The
former risks handing power to “the most dangerous branch”206 with
few truly effective options to constrain arbitrary power.207 It is a
course of muddling through that may never get at the heart of the
legitimacy problems of the administrative state because it fails to prioritize reforms that permit citizens to determine their own political
fate and therefore is unlikely to improve the administrative state’s
standing in the eyes of the public.208 The remaining Parts will discuss
how a republican theory of politics can point the way toward a more
inclusive, publicly-minded, and publicly-directed administrative state.
V. FREEDOM AS NONDOMINATION OR FREEDOM FROM
POLITICS? THE DELIBERATIVE MODEL AND TWO
VERSIONS OF REPUBLICANISM
Now that the dilemma of technocratic governance and presidential
control has been explored, this Part begins the discussion of a republican approach to administrative decision-making that resolves the dilemma. Republican political theory first made an explicit appearance
in administrative law scholarship with the development of the deliberative model of administrative rulemaking.209 The deliberative model
originated in the late 1980s and early 1990s as an answer to concerns
about agency legitimacy.210 By this time, older justifications for the
administrative state’s lawmaking discretion, like the expertise model,
205. See supra Parts I–II.
206. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power To Say
What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 219 (1994).
207. But see Evan D. Bernick, Faithful Execution: Where Administrative Law Meets
the Constitution, 108 GEO. L.J. 1, 41–44 (2019) (arguing that the Take Care
Clause in Article II could function as a meaningful restraint on arbitrary presidential decision-making).
208. A related point applicable to both disclosure and judicial review proposals is that
the President and their staff do not personally get involved in every rulemaking.
See Bressman, supra note 22, at 514 (noting presidential involvement “is sporadic
at best”). The rulemakings not subject to the President’s personal involvement or
the involvement of EOP staff are thus left to the ordinary technocratic rulemaking process.
209. Professor Mark Seidenfeld’s 1992 article, A Civic Republican Justification for the
Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511 (1992), is the most comprehensive
exposition of the deliberative model, and although more recent articles have continued to debate and refine the deliberative model, see Seidenfeld, supra note 22,
at 1397; Arkush, supra note 41, at 1477; Glen Staszewski, Political Reasons, Deliberative Democracy, and Administrative Law, 97 IOWA L. REV. 849 (2012), the
structure laid out in Seidenfeld’s 1992 article is still the touchstone for the deliberative model.
210. See, e.g., Robert B. Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An Interpretive Essay, 94 YALE L.J. 1617 (1985); MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE
GUARDIANS?: JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 26–34 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988); Seidenfeld, supra
note 209.
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had worn thin (at least in academic circles), and newer justifications
for agency legitimacy, like the interest group (or pluralist) account,
could not conclusively put to rest serious doubts about the proper role
of private interest in government.211 As noted deliberative model proponent Professor Mark Seidenfeld put it, “[I]n the modern state, many
agency decisions involve political choices that ‘make law,’ even though
agencies exist outside traditional conceptions of our tripartite national
government.”212 Drawing on republican political theory, deliberative
model proponents were suspicious of government due to the role of
private interest groups in creating regulatory policies. They sought to
answer questions about legitimacy by resorting to a theoretical framework for government regulation based on the common good with
agency procedures designed to promote such regulation.213
With its suspicion of the role of private interest in government, the
deliberative model at least nominally recognizes the value of public
participation and deliberation; however, the theoretical underpinning
of the deliberative model fails to take public participation in deliberation seriously or, worse, discounts it entirely.214 This contradiction between the superficial goals of the deliberative model and its
theoretical foundation prevents the deliberative model from serving as
a solution to the problems caused by the liberal proceduralist view of
the administrative state. Indeed, Seidenfeld has gone so far as to argue that a lack of incentives, time, and resources means the general
public is insufficiently informed to contribute meaningfully to policy
making deliberation.215 In some versions of the deliberative model,
providing public-regarding reasons for government action is consid211. See Stewart, supra note 21, at 1681–88, 1762–70 (discussing the inability of older
concepts of administrative law, like the expertise model, to account for agency
discretion and critiquing the interest, or pluralist, representation account of administrative law as susceptible to private interests); Seidenfeld, supra note 22, at
1407–09 (noting the various ways the pluralist account of administrative law
may bias regulations in the favor of powerful private interests); Seidenfeld, supra
note 209, at 1536 (“[P]luralism invariably produces political distortions that
serve to perpetuate existing bases of economic and political power.”).
212. Seidenfeld, supra note 209, at 1513; see also Staszewski, supra note 209, at
851–53 (acknowledging that even under the deliberative model, political motivation cannot be easily divorced from agency decision-making); SHAPIRO, supra note
210, at 24 (noting that even judges cannot make entirely neutral decisions on
issues of public policy).
213. See Seidenfeld, supra note 209, at 1528, 1533–34, 1541–42.
214. See, e.g., id. at 1558 (stating that agencies fail to take into account the values of
the minority); SHAPIRO, supra note 210, at 34 (“Surely the people want right administrative decisions, so as long as the administrators arrive at policies by careful deliberation, the people will approve their policies.”); Glen Staszewski,
Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1284 (2009) (arguing
that reason-giving can replace electoral politics as a way to generate
accountability).
215. Seidenfeld, supra note 22, at 1445.
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ered enough to satisfy the republican demand that government actions track the common good.216 In all versions, agency staff
deliberate with minimal input from the public through notice and
comment.217 And because regulatory policy is often solidified before a
proposed rule is released for comment, deliberative model theorists
suggest that notice and comment serves the even more limited role of
ensuring that no important interests were missed.218
By failing to classify widespread participation in deliberation as
necessary, versions of the deliberative model associate too closely with
the liberal proceduralist account of government and its pitfalls.219 In
the absence of vigorous participation and deliberation in the rulemaking process by ordinary citizens, the deliberative model might produce
regulations that track the common good, but only by happenstance.
Even if public comment procedures provide agencies with some information about values held by individuals, without the institutional
structure necessary to actually participate in deliberation and decide
policy, citizens are unable to define the common good.
Despite the deliberative model’s promise to fashion a more stable
foundation for the administrative state, our inquiry has led us back to
where we started: an administrative state hostile to the inclusion of
the political considerations of the public. The deliberative model must
be examined more closely to identify which of its features are drawn
from republican political theory and to determine whether a more robust adoption of republicanism paves the way toward firmer ground
for agency legitimacy.

216. See, e.g., Staszewski, supra note 214.
217. See id. at 1288; SHAPIRO, supra note 210, at 34; Seidenfeld, supra note 209, at
1540; Staszewski, supra note 209, at 887–88.
218. Seidenfeld, supra note 22, at 1447. Deliberative model proponents have recognized that agency decisions cannot be neatly separated from political considerations. See id. at 1428–29; see also Staszewski, supra note 209, at 893 (arguing
that political preferences have a role in the deliberative model and asserting that
voting functions as a legitimization of those preferences). Like the proponents of
presidential control examined in Part III, supra, Seidenfeld sees the benefit of
considering the President’s political preferences in the decision-making process.
See Seidenfeld, supra note 22, at 1452–53. Notwithstanding, Seidenfeld cannot
shake his distrust of political influence and argues in favor of restricting the
President’s influence. See id. at 1453. He suggests that Presidents should only
have the ability to choose between predetermined alternatives selected by agency
experts. See id. Where a President makes the choice, a reviewing court would be
expected to discount the President’s political preferences altogether and apply
more rigor to the decision to ensure that the agency can defend the regulation on
its rationality alone. See id. at 1456–57.
219. For a discussion of the liberal proceduralist account and its pitfalls, see supra
Part II.
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A Brief Background on Republican Political Theory

The deliberative model draws its requirement that regulations be
consistent with the common good and public-minded sensibilities from
republican political theory.220 Because this Article is not a review of
modern and historical republican theories, it will suffice to recognize
two relevant forms of republican political theory.221 These are the
main two modern branches of republican political theory, and each is
associated with its respective historical progenitor.
The first branch has its roots in the political theory of Aristotle and
classical Athenian politics,222 as described by J.G.A. Pocock in The
Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic
Republican Tradition,223 and is often associated with modern theorists like Hannah Arendt and Michael Sandel. Aristotelian republicanism has, at its heart, a belief that participation in communal selfgovernment is the true nature of human beings and the only way to
live freely.224 Only through active participation in the public life of the
community can humans realize the good life, and the virtues required
for active participation—namely those required to distinguish between private interest and the common good—must be cultivated.225
Sandel refers to the government effort to encourage citizens to cultivate certain virtues, which are both good in themselves and because
they facilitate the kind of participation and deliberation necessary for
self-government, as the “formative project.”226 This “robust” form of
republicanism ultimately relies on “the basic . . . tenant that the freedom of the political community must depend in the last resort on the
public virtue of the citizens.”227 In this way, the robust form of repub220. Seidenfeld, supra note 209, at 1528.
221. While I will only mention two forms of republicanism, it should be noted that this
is a highly simplified approach. See Marco Geuna, The Tension Between Law and
Politics in the Modern Republican Tradition, in REPUBLICAN DEMOCRACY: LIBERTY, LAW AND POLITICS 5, 8–9 (Andreas Niederberger & Philipp Schink eds.,
2013).
222. See SANDEL, supra note 103, at 26 (noting the “strong version” of republicanism
goes back to Aristotle).
223. See generally J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 66–67 (Princeton Classics ed. 2016) (1975) (“[T]hat tradition (which may almost be termed the tradition
of mixed government) is Aristotelian, and the Politics . . . form[s] the earliest and
greatest full exposition of it . . . .”).
224. See id. at 67–68.
225. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 23–24 (C.D.C. Reeve trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1998) (c. 350
B.C.E.).
226. SANDEL, supra note 103, at 5–6, 323.
227. David Miller, Republicanism, National Identity, and Europe, in REPUBLICANISM
AND POLITICAL THEORY 133, 140–41 (Cécile Laborde & John Maynor eds., 2008).
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licanism holds fast to the belief that citizens cannot delegate ultimate
control over their political community to anyone but themselves.228
The second main branch of republicanism is associated with the
political institutions of ancient Rome.229 Quentin Skinner, among
others, developed the modern account of this form of republicanism as
a critique of the historical and theoretical continuity of the Aristotelian republicanism described by Pocock.230 This form of republicanism
“is not a form of Aristotelian politics.”231 Instead, it describes a particular “form of negative liberty” that conceives of participation in public
life by citizens not as the natural end of existence, but as a way to
guard against the arbitrary exercise of government power.232 Thus,
participation ensures liberty insofar as it is a bulwark against a government of private interest.233 Philip Pettit, the most famous modern
expositor of this kind of republicanism, defined the primary goal of
this brand of republicanism as “freedom as nondomination.”234 Under
this framework, individuals are free to choose their own ends so long
as society commits to and avoids domination that would subject individuals to the arbitrary control of another.235 This form of republicanism also promotes the cultivation of certain civic virtues that are
required for the maintenance of the commitment to freedom as
nondomination. These virtues, unlike in the Aristotelian form, are not
the ultimate goal of life—they are merely instrumental in protecting
private liberty preserved by nondomination.236 Because the primary
228. See Ferejohn, supra note 135, at 148 (“The Roman (classical [republican]) bargain
. . . amounted to giving, or better, yielding to the people (or to nonelites) control
over the law in return for elite control over policy. Laws and law-making at Rome
were therefore direct or popular . . . .”); Miller, supra note 227, at 141.
229. See, e.g., QUENTIN SKINNER, LIBERTY BEFORE LIBERALISM 5 (2012); Quentin Skinner, Freedom as the Absence of Arbitrary Power, in REPUBLICANISM AND POLITICAL
THEORY, supra note 227, at 83, 85–87. The relationship between this form of republicanism and the operation of the Roman Republic of classical antiquity is still
subject to debate. See John P. McCormick, Republicanism and Democracy, in REPUBLICAN DEMOCRACY: LIBERTY, LAW AND POLITICS 89, 99–100 (Andreas
Niederberger & Philipp Schink eds., 2013) (noting modern forms of this type of
republicanism have been less than enthusiastic about reviving institutions like
the Roman Tribunate, which held veto power over any legislation introduced in
the Senate).
230. Geuna, supra note 221, at 6–11.
231. Id. at 7.
232. Id.; see Henry S. Richardson, Republicanism and Democratic Injustice, 5 POL.
PHIL. & ECON. 175, 179 (2006).
233. See Philip Pettit, Reworking Sandel’s Republicanism, in DEBATING DEMOCRACY’S
DISCONTENT: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN POLITICS, LAW, AND PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 40, 52
(Anita L. Allen & Milton C. Regan, Jr. eds., 1998).
234. Id. at 49.
235. See id. at 49, 54–55 (referring to this quasi-neutral position as “shared-value neutralism,” meaning that the only societal requirement is that all share the value of
nondomination after which one is free to live as they please).
236. Id.
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goal of instrumental republicanism is to preserve negative liberty so
that individuals may choose their own ends, it is less concerned about
the cultivation of the character (or public virtue,237 as some might call
it) of citizens through participation in self-rule.238 Instrumental republicanism is, as a result, often skeptical of politics, relying on depoliticized expert commissions in policy areas where theorists believe
ordinary politics will produce the wrong result.239 This is why instrumental republicanism has been described as “a kind of quasi-liberal
theory that is grounded on the kind of individualism on which liberalism is founded.”240 It is this similarity that makes this kind of republicanism a poor vehicle for addressing the legitimacy problems of
the administrative state.
B.

The Deliberative Model and Its Unexamined Connection
to Instrumental Republicanism

The deliberative model’s similarity to the instrumental form of republicanism renders it incapable of bolstering the legitimacy of the
administrative state. To see how the deliberative model mirrors instrumental republicanism, we need only consider the problem both
seek to solve and the institutional arrangement chosen to solve it.
Both are concerned that politicians will be too responsive to popular
politics, and both therefore attempt to preserve the common good
within depoliticized, expert-led institutions.241 In a telling passage,
Seidenfeld explains that “one cannot subject decisionmakers to more
direct political pressure without threatening the civic republican ideal
that decisionmakers act deliberatively.”242 At bottom, both theories
believe that policy should reflect the common good but are doubtful
237. See Miller, supra note 227.
238. See Pettit, supra note 233, at 54–55.
239. See Philip Pettit, Depoliticizing Democracy, 17 RATIO JURIS 52, 55–56 (2004) (citing criminal sentencing policy and prostitution as two examples where policy cannot be entrusted to democratic politics); cf. Ferejohn, supra note 135, at 148
(discussing Pettit’s assertions); McCormick, supra note 229, at 105–12 (critiquing
Pettit’s framework); Miller, supra note 227; Michael Sandel, Reply to Critics, in
DEBATING DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN POLITICS, LAW, AND
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY, supra note 233, at 319, 325–26 (arguing against the instrumental version of republicanism).
240. Ferejohn, supra note 135, at 148. Pocock describes this kind of republicanism as
“an empire of laws” that denies humans the chance to “shape themselves.”
POCOCK, supra note 223, at 558–59.
241. Seidenfeld, supra note 209, at 1576 (explaining that administrative agencies “fall
between the extremes of the politically over-responsive legislature and the underresponsive courts” and arguing that as a result, administrative agencies can
“check majoritarian tyranny”); Pettit, supra note 239, at 53 (arguing that if certain electoral interests are involved, politicians “cannot be reliably expected to
decide . . . issues by reference just to considerations of the common good”).
242. Seidenfeld, supra note 209, at 1541.

466

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:424

that the general public has much of value to say about the content of
that common good.243
Accordingly, the major difference between instrumental republicanism and the deliberative model turns out to be only superficial: Instrumental republicanism explicitly establishes a primary value to set
the bounds of government action—freedom as nondomination—
whereas the deliberative model does not.244 In practice, this is a distinction without a difference. Understanding this superficial distinction reveals why minimalist republican theories, like the deliberative
model, cannot rise to the challenge the administrative state faces today. Because the deliberative model has absorbed the expertise model
of the administrative state wholesale, it has done implicitly what instrumental republicanism does explicitly—adopted an objective conception of the common good. For the deliberative model, the common
good amounts to whatever agency staff determine it is, as based on
technocratic policy analysis. Democratic politics cannot guarantee the
outcomes demanded by the deliberative model any more than it can
guarantee the outcome demanded by instrumental republicanism. Yet
each theory is unable to address the problems raised in this Article
because the ends they seek—nondomination or rationally-supported
policy—are unlikely to be determined without democratic contestation
in the first place.245
Take, for example, criminal sentencing laws. Philip Pettit argues
that leaving criminal sentencing laws up to elected representatives
will necessarily lead to harsher criminal sentences because ordinary
morals, driven by unthinking passion, will always favor harsh punishment for those who commit crime.246 Leaving aside the fact that today
the dominant political movement is toward more lenient sentencing
laws,247 Pettit assumes that the only end to criminal sentencing—that
243. See Seidenfeld, supra note 22, at 1445; Farina et al., supra note 48, at 142–44.
244. Pettit, supra note 233, at 51–54; Seidenfeld, supra note 209, at 1528 (noting that
the form of civic republicanism drawn on by the deliberative model does not
“posit[ ] some external conception of the common good”). But see Staszewski,
supra note 209, at 899 (arguing that the deliberative process should be held to
the arbitrary and capricious standard). In effect, though not in rhetoric,
Seidenfeld’s proposals are not meaningfully different from those advanced by
Staszewski. See Seidenfeld, supra note 22, at 1456–57 (arguing that courts
should completely disregard political considerations when reviewing regulations
and examine them on their rationality alone).
245. Cf. Sandel, supra note 239, at 327 (“And just as people of differing moral and
ideological persuasions disagree about the meaning of civic virtue and the qualities of character self-government requires, so people disagree about what counts
as domination . . . . [H]ow to identify and cope with the sources of domination in
the modern world is an intensely political questions that too often goes unaddressed in our politics.”).
246. Pettit, supra note 239, at 54.
247. See, e.g., Bill Rankin, Nathan Deal’s Criminal Justice Reforms Leave Lasting Legacy, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.ajc.com/news/local/deal-

2021]

POLITICIZING REGULATION

467

is, the common good—is a policy whereby incarceration rates are kept
as low as possible while crime rates are also kept low.248 Accordingly,
criminal sentencing policy should be left to depoliticized expert commissions that can rationally deliberate about the facts and design a
policy consistent with the common good.249 Pettit’s description of
criminal sentencing policy is certainly laudable—indeed, it may even
be the common good—but a policy that reduces incarceration rates but
leads to no increase in crime is not necessarily the right policy. Some
people believe that criminal sentences should be harsh to demonstrate
society’s moral condemnation of certain crimes,250 while others believe any kind of incarceration is immoral.251 Without first establishing the political community’s common good, no set of facts about the
effects of one policy versus another can decide which one truly tracks
the common good. What goals we should pursue and why we should
pursue them are matters for the judgment of politics, not panels of
experts.
Another example further illustrates the threat instrumental republicanism poses to repairing the estrangement of ordinary people
from the administrative state. Seidenfeld references the 1997
rulemaking process by the National Highway Safety Administration
(NHTSA) concerning whether to allow car dealerships to install an
on–off switch for airbags.252 The NHTSA received 600 comments from
the general public, nearly all of which favored allowing the installation of the on–off switches as a matter of personal choice.253 The
agency, reasoning “that the public did not understand the costs and
benefits of airbags,” maintained its position that the switches should
be restricted.254 Ultimately, the NHTSA promulgated a rule that severely limited airbag switch installation and simultaneously launched
a public information campaign.255 The campaign aimed to educate

248.
249.
250.

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

criminal-justice-reforms-leaves-lasting-legacy/ZMwb2vG7C4LurWoFESw46O/
[https://perma.cc/4WDB-NQEU]; Ames Grawert & Tim Lau, How the FIRST
STEP Act Became Law—and What Happens Next, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan.
4, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/how-firststep-act-became-law-and-what-happens-next [https://perma.cc/L8ZU-DG78].
See Pettit, supra note 239, at 54–55.
Id. at 55.
See, e.g., Matthew Haist, Deterrence in a Sea of “Just Desserts”: Are Utilitarian
Goals Achievable in a World of “Limiting Retributivism,” 99 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 789, 793–94 (2009) (noting that some believe that society is morally obligated to punish wrongdoers).
See, e.g., Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L.
REV. 1156, 1239 (2015).
Air Bag On-Off Switches, 62 Fed. Reg. 62,406 (Nov. 21, 1997) (codified at 49
C.F.R. pts. 571, 595).
Id. at 62,413–16.
Seidenfeld, supra note 22, at 1433.
See id. at 1432–33 (citing Mendelson, supra note 39, at 1366). The agency’s education campaign was designed to inform the public about the costs and benefits of
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the public on the “proper” perspective of the risks and benefits of
airbags, which, as Seidenfeld notes, does not appear to have altered
the public’s view of the issue.256
Seidenfeld and Pettit approach these policy dilemmas from the assumption that the general public is hopelessly backward in their understanding of the true costs and benefits in of all kinds of policy, but
especially policies that implicate some important value judgments—
personal autonomy in the case of airbag switches and just deserts in
the case of criminal sentencing. If the public had the professional
training of an economist (or some similar profession), they would understand that a rational person would only choose the policy chosen by
the experts.
The mistake lies in the assumption that value judgments are not a
proper basis for choosing one policy over another. It is simply not true,
however, that those who favor one position do so because of some unthinking moral reaction, while those who reach the opposite conclusion do so by rationally weighing the facts in the absence of moral
considerations. Both positions rely to some inescapable extent on
moral commitments. Moral considerations are part and parcel of what
the common good is. Claiming that shared moral commitments play
no role in public policy just opens the door to submerging moral decisions under purportedly apolitical justifications. They are still there;
they are just not up for debate.
These two examples demonstrate the ways in which the deliberative model has become a conduit for the fundamental flaw of the procedural republic. Notwithstanding the rhetoric about the deliberative
model, it has taken on this character in practice because it is committed to an imagined objective, expert-derived common good in service of
private ends.257 The deliberative model asks little of citizens (and at
times demands citizens to keep out) but requires their tacit acceptance
of the values it installs as the common good. The stance that agencies
have no need for public input “can have a corrosive effect on civic life”
and “may preempt what potential exists for the creation or discovery
of shared commitments and public values.”258 In circumstances where
agencies eschew public input, nothing binds those who disagree with
the policy to regard it as legitimate.259 “For such policies are then supported not by community consensus but only by debatable facts, inference, and tradeoffs,”260 making the disconnect between citizens and

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

airbag switches as the agency understood them in the hopes that the public would
adopt its assessment that “there were few instances in which a switch to turn off
airbags was warranted.” Id.
Id. (citing Mendelson, supra note 39, at 1366).
See Pettit, supra note 233, at 49–50.
Reich, supra note 210, at 1637.
See id.
Id.
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the administrative state and the resulting political upheavals all the
more likely.261 The deliberative model’s “common and easy resort to
[agency staff] . . . dwarf[s] the political capacity of the people, and . . .
deaden[s] its sense of moral responsibility. It is no light thing to do
that.”262 The deliberative model is, therefore, less likely to be stable
because it has no way to resolve debate between agencies and the people about the nature of the common good.263
The deliberative model’s similarities with instrumental republicanism ensure that it cannot solve the problem of the legitimacy of
administrative agencies. If the deliberative model’s embrace of a modest form of republicanism fundamentally cannot rise to the modern
challenge to administrative agencies, a more robust form of republicanism—one that recognizes the necessity of the formative project—
very well may be able to.
VI. FROM INDIVIDUALS TO CITIZENS: AN ARGUMENT FOR
ROBUST REPUBLICAN POLITICS
The argument I have advanced thus far prioritizes politics because—unlike law, facts, or technocratic administration—only politics
can accommodate the divergent interests of citizens, provide a forum
for the expression of those interests, encourage the development of
qualities needed to express interests to fellow citizens, promote the
formation of common interests above private ones, and show the way
toward a consensual understanding of the common good. By giving up
on politics, as the deliberative model and other modern accounts of
administrative law have, theories of administrative legitimacy have
had to content themselves with the unavoidable tension between, on
one hand, a large, active bureaucracy as the locus of most lawmaking
and, on the other, a political structure that defines legitimacy in democratic terms. Leaving this tension unresolved has led to unfortunate
consequences. Lack of faith in the ability of government to meet the
challenges society faces in a rapidly changing world, the rise of antiestablishment political movements, and the divisive politics of our
time are likely the bitter fruit of the unresolved legitimacy of our most
active sector of government. In Tocqueville’s words, the administrative state has taken a form in which “liberty can only advance by revo261. See Kahan, supra note 151.
262. Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1002, 1007
(1924) (quoting JOHN BRADLEY THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 103–10 (De Capo Press
1974) (1901)). Both Justice Frankfurter and Professor Thayer were describing the
corrosive effects of judicial review on questions of constitutionality. See id. at
1007–08. Nevertheless, the sentiment applies equally powerfully here.
263. See Sandel, supra note 239.

470

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:424

lutions.”264 And if this is the problem we face, then only a
recommitment to politics is up to the challenge. Only through frequent
participation “under conditions of responsibility” can regulatory policy
escape the shadow of illegitimacy that comes with rulemaking by an
agency expert or the President.265
At an abstract level, a robust form of republican politics must be a
politics wherein freedom consists in common self-government, not just
individual self-determination. As a corollary, minimalist republican
theories “must broaden their focus . . . beyond government institutions. A civic republican conception of citizenship supposes that people
must be engaged in framing the rules and administering the institutions that govern all aspects of their communal lives.”266 Citizens can
be free only when self-government rests not on the parochial interests
of someone else but on the common good, as informed by the shared
values and mutual ideas about what is best for the political community as a whole.267 These bonds between citizens are formed not
through majoritarian government but instead through true self-government, which requires engagement with and deliberation of matters
of public concern over and over again.268 Undoubtedly, the path to
shared values will be hard-fought and contentious, and whatever notions about the common good that coalesce will be ephemeral and open
to future debate. Yet, for all its indeterminacy, “public deliberation
helps transform individual valuations into social values; it helps forge
collective purposes, and, even more important, helps define and refine
public morality. Through such deliberations, individuals become citizens.”269 Over time and with repeated engagement, individuals can
form a political community of citizens.
But even more than creating shared bonds and shared values, engagement in politics cultivates the virtues required to live in a self264. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 68 (Phillips Bradley ed.,
Henry Reeve trans. & Francis Bowin rev. trans., Alfred A. Knopf 1945) (1835).
265. Sandel, supra note 239, at 326.
266. Paul Brest, Further Beyond the Republican Revival: Toward Radical Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1623, 1626 (1988).
267. See JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 146, 189, 215 (Swallow Press
1954) (1927) (asserting that organization of government officials should be done
so as to secure public—not private—ends and arguing that the public should be
organized to participate actively in decisions of public ends); Anderson, supra
note 120, at 13 (noting that Dewey emphasized the value of bringing citizens together to define public problems and public solutions through discussion). Relegating the public to purely electoral means and excluding it from actual
participation in governmental action to determine public ends amounts to a “form
of coercion and suppression [that] is more subtle and more effective than . . . overt
intimidation and restraint.” JOHN DEWEY, THE MORAL WRITINGS OF JOHN DEWEY
265 (James Gouinlock ed., 1994).
268. See Reich, supra note 210, at 1632.
269. Id.
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governing society. “Sharing in the governance of a political community
that controls its own fate calls forth distinctive human capacities—for
judgment, deliberation, persuasion, and action—that would otherwise
lie dormant.”270 Without the practice that comes with frequent engagement and judgment with other citizens on issues that have real
consequences, members of a political community cannot develop the
capacities—including the feeling of responsibility for the fate of the
community—required for genuine self-rule.271 The challenge and the
promise of republican theory is as Goethe famously put it: “When we
take people . . . merely as they are, we make them worse; when we
treat them as if they were what they should be, we improve them as
far as they can be improved.”272 It is the engagement in active deliberation and participation with consequences that calls forth and trains
the qualities of a citizen, making self-government possible and conferring legitimacy on policy decisions.273
Through regular engagement with fellow citizens wherein their
collective decisions are dispositive, citizens can develop the virtues required to deliberate with each other in good faith, build common moral
bonds, put aside purely individual interests in favor of what they believe is the common interest, and take responsibility for the fate of the
community as directed by their decisions. As citizens engage in deliberation and action together on issues important to the political community, they not only can be said to live freely in that they have a
direct hand in governing themselves but also can build consensus
around the actions of the government. By doing so, citizens can develop a “common purpose” that builds solidarity, empowering citizens
to voluntarily accept the decisions of the community and making government action more effective and legitimate.274
270. Sandel, supra note 239, at 325.
271. JOHN DEWEY, Liberalism and Social Action, in 2 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS,
1925–1953, at 44 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 2008)); Sandel, supra note 239, at 326
(“Deliberation under conditions of collective impotence does not cultivate the
sense of responsibility and moral burden associated with genuine self-rule.”). As
John Stuart Mill put it, a “political act to be done only once in a few years, and for
which nothing in the daily habits of the citizen has prepared him” is worthless.
JOHN STUART MILL, ESSAYS ON POLITICS AND CULTURE 229 (Gertrude Himmelfarb
ed., 1963). Similarly, T.B. Bottomore expressed, “It does not seem to me that a
man can live in a condition of [complete and] unalterable subordination during
much of his life, and yet acquire the habits of responsible choice and self-government which political democracy calls for.” T.B. Bottomore, The Insufficiency of
Elite Competition, in FRONTIERS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 127, 135 (Henry S.
Kariel ed., 1970).
272. 2 JOHANN WOLFGANG VON GOETHE, WILHELM MEISTER’S APPRENTICESHIP AND
TRAVELS 219 (Thomas Carlyle trans., 1824) (1795).
273. Sandel, supra note 239, at 326.
274. Danielle Allen, A More Resilient Union: How Federalism Can Protect Democracy
from Pandemics, 99 FOREIGN AFFS. 33, 36 (2020). A common purpose is “a practical tool that allows people to achieve something together.” Id. According to Pro-
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The Role of Science in the Robust Republican State

What should be the role of scientific inquiry and expert evaluation
if politics is to take center stage in regulatory policy? Quite clearly, we
cannot hope to achieve our political goals without the help of relevant
experts. Yet, to respect the values and goals of the political community, technocratic forms of government should be subordinated to political control. Science should be rightly celebrated for its expansion of
human potential, but it cannot be the sole guide of human political
thinking; rather, it can only aid and advise citizens in their engagement in politics.275 As Dewey put it: “No government by experts in
which the masses do not have the chance to inform the experts as to
their needs can be anything but an oligarchy managed in the interests
of the few.”276 To turn over decisions to scientific inquiry alone denies
citizens the forum “to realize their distinctive capacities” and to form
the common purpose that makes self-government possible.277 To Tocqueville, the science of forming civic associations for common action “is
the mother of all knowledge since the success of all the others depends
upon it.”278 For it is these associations, Tocqueville argued, that “ensure that men remain or become civilized.”279
There is still room for science in policy, however. Science and the
experts that interpret its findings are essential to the proper functioning of government. In an advisory role, scientific analysis can help
clarify the facts surrounding an issue of deliberation and debate in a
political community, and engagement with these facts—as best as we
can know them, given the limits of scientific inquiry—is a critical part
of engaging in politics in good faith with other citizens under conditions of responsibility. The political community must understand the
state of the world to knowingly take responsibility for its collective
decisions. Even when the consequences of a policy cannot accurately

275.

276.
277.

278.
279.

fessor Danielle Allen, it “is perhaps the most powerful tool in the democratic
toolkit, particularly in a crisis, because it can yield the solidarity that induces
people to do hard things voluntarily rather than through authoritarian compulsion.” Id.
Cf. ARENDT, supra note 114, at 45, 53. Arendt argues that modern society’s reliance on behavioral and economic science destroys the public political realm and
replaces it with “housekeeping” concerns. Id. at 45. She further suggests that by
replacing the public realm with housekeeping, science has removed the space
that separates our private lives from our public lives but also united people with
something tangible—the public sphere. Id. at 45–46.
DEWEY, supra note 267, at 208.
See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY: ESSAYS ON MORALITY IN POLITICS
189 (2005); see also Allen, supra note 274, at 37–38 (arguing that scientism has
sapped Americans’ ability to engage in political judgment or participate in civic
life).
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA AND TWO ESSAYS ON AMERICA
600 (Gerald E. Bevan trans., Penguin Books 2003) (1835) (emphasis added).
Id.
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be predicted, knowing the likelihood of a particular outcome is still
valuable information. The political community can accept making a
best guess under circumstances of uncertainty because the political
process is open, contestable, and iterative—or, in Dewey’s terms, “experimental.”280 In other words, “[d]emocratic decision-making needs
to recognize its own fallibility” so that new information can be used to
devise better solutions.281 While understanding the limits of scientific
analysis is of paramount importance to the vitality of self-government,
the aid of experts—who, with the right approach, can help define the
proper limits of science—is a necessary ingredient of functional selfgovernment.
B.

A Brief Response to the Utopian Critique

It is common to call this kind of politics utopian.282 Given the sorry
state of political participation today (social media posts notwithstanding),283 critics argue that it would be impossible to get people to participate in this way, and even if it were, it would be dangerous to
try.284 Skeptics of republican politics believe that ordinary people
have so little information, ability, and interest that any decisions they
would make about complex regulatory policy would rest on arbitrary,
280. By “experimental,” Dewey meant “not just messing around nor doing a little of
this and a little of that in the hope that things will improve.” Dewey, supra note
107, at 228 (“Just as in the physical sciences, it implies a coherent body of ideas, a
theory, that gives direction to effort. What is implied, in contrast to every form of
absolutism, is that the ideas and theory be taken as methods of action tested and
continuously revised by the consequences they produce in actual social
conditions.”).
281. Anderson, supra note 120, at 12.
282. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U.
PA. L. REV. 801, 859 n.201 (1993) (arguing that modern forms of republicanism
can be criticized as utopian); Christopher Edley, Jr., The Governance Crisis, Legal Theory, and Political Ideology, 1991 DUKE L.J. 561, 592–93 (claiming that
modern republican theories either “have a utopian quality, or they have a general
reformist cast”); see also Jeremy Waldron, Virtue en Masse, in DEBATING DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN POLITICS, LAW, AND PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY, supra note 233, at 32, 36–37 (arguing that it is completely implausible to
believe that traditional civic virtue makes any sense as a governing mechanism
in a world as large and impersonal as the one we live in).
283. See EITAN HERSH, POLITICS IS FOR POWER: HOW TO MOVE BEYOND POLITICAL HOBBYISM, TAKE ACTION, AND MAKE REAL CHANGE 3–10, 109–116 (2020) (arguing that
spending time reading or watching the news, posting on social media, and watching political video clips is political hobbyism rather than actual political
participation).
284. See Seidenfeld, supra note 22, at 1431–35 (noting the ways public participation
would skew regulatory policy toward irrelevant or unthinking positions); Farina
et al., supra note 48, at 142–44 (arguing that regulators justifiably ignore a majority of comments from the general public because they often suffer from fundamental defects like erroneous information, failure to take into account competing
arguments, or inability to consider more nuanced outcomes).

474

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:424

emotional reactions or a mistaken understanding of the advantages
and disadvantages of the policy.285 Such decisions would lead to ineffective government that would fail to deliver the results citizens expect and further erode trust and legitimacy. But the skeptics’ position
fails to directly address the challenge of reconciling agency discretion
with the legitimate exercise of political authority.
To put these criticisms in perspective, it is first useful to see that
reliance on expert or agency staff as the oracles of the “right” or “best”
policy is just as idealistic as the politics I have outlined above.286
Agency staff have no claim to defining the common good merely by
virtue of their professional training.287 It is just as likely that they
would misinterpret a private or parochial interest common to professionals as the common good.288 Professional agency staff are, moreover, just as (and possibly more) susceptible to the issues that already
divide the public.289 Agency staff have no direct way to compare their
positions against those of the public’s as a whole. There is simply no
reason to believe that agency staff magically uncover a fully formed,
objective common good through technocratic methods. Whatever the
common good might be, there is generally a healthy measure of disagreement about what it is.
The deliberative model, like its cousins, has no answer for how to
forge the kind of agreement that is needed for regulation to be both
effective and legitimate. It is unclear how the deliberative model can
avoid politics in its decisions about policy unless it simply ignores
politics altogether. Unless one truly believes that identifying the common good is a purely technical exercise in finding an objective fact, it
seems unobjectionable to favor a politics that, though difficult to
achieve, fosters the qualities and basic structure necessary for public
control over government policy.
Nevertheless, to implement this kind of politics would mean a radical change in how citizens, politicians, and agency staff understand
their roles and a radical change in the operation of the administrative
285. See, e.g., Farina et al., supra note 48, at 142–44.
286. See McCormick, supra note 229, at 112 (“Is it more utopian to expect, on the one
hand, such [mini-citizen assemblies] to make generally good decisions or, on the
other, to expect elites to behave in a consistently impartial and depoliticized
fashion?”).
287. In fact, the opposite might be true. See Ventriss et al., supra note 50. Even Hegel
recognized the need for both expertise and “direct education in ethics and in
thought” for bureaucrats. G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT
335 (Allen W. Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 1991).
288. See McCormick, supra note 229, at 112.
289. See HERSH, supra note 283, at 35 (finding that individuals who follow the news
and are highly educated are more partisan than individuals who do not follow the
news and have less education).
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state. The following Part will attempt to provide a few thoughts on
how some of this project could be implemented.
VII. “COUNCILS, GREAT OR SMALL”: SOME POSSIBLE
REFORMS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
The following Part is meant only to sketch out some possible reforms that might pave the way for the republican politics I describe
above. It is by no means comprehensive. Much work remains to build
the structures that would permit the public to control regulatory policy and, in turn, bolster the legitimacy of the administrative state.
Still, a couple of examples may help light the way toward a more inclusive and public-minded administrative state.
The EPA’s attempt to facilitate public deliberation about national
emissions standards of inorganic arsenic (known as the Asarco case) is
an encouraging example of an agency attempting to foster strong republican politics.290 To understand why, a brief summary of the substance of the regulation is required. Section 112 of the Clean Air Act
requires the EPA to promulgate national emissions standards for hazardous air pollutants.291 In setting those limits, Section 112 permits
the EPA to consider costs, non-air quality health and environmental
impacts, and energy requirements.292 The EPA is also permitted to
set limits within an “ample margin of safety.”293 Congress gave the
EPA no direction on how to balance those competing considerations or
how to determine what constitutes an ample margin of safety. In
1983, EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus announced three public workshops in Tacoma, Washington, and the surrounding area to
afford residents a forum to wrestle with setting the arsenic limit and
the tradeoffs that various restrictions would require.294 Tacoma was
chosen because a major source of inorganic arsenic, the Asarco copper
smelter, was located in the area. At each workshop, experts from the
EPA presented the details of the pollution, its effects, and the expected consequences of different limits.295
The effects of the experiment on EPA policy were ultimately limited. Falling copper prices shuttered the smelter before the EPA could
set a limit.296 Nonetheless, we can learn important lessons from the
290. See generally Reich, supra note 210, at 1632–34 (describing the Asarco case); ESTHER SCOTT & RICHARD INNES, MANAGING ENVIRONMENTAL RISK: THE CASE OF
ASARCO (1988).
291. 42 U.S.C. § 7412.
292. Id. § 7412(d)(1).
293. Id. § 7412(d)(4).
294. Reich, supra note 210, at 1632–33.
295. Id. at 1633.
296. Id. at 1634–35.
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attempt.297 The public workshops forced participants to come face to
face with those who held different positions, and personalizing the issue in this way may have shifted the focus from “ ‘winning’ to finding a
solution most appropriate to the special character of the community.”298 Ruckelshaus recalled that residents exposed to the pollution
but without a financial or employment stake in the issue grew interested in solutions that involved halting both the pollution and the loss
of jobs as “a feeling of citizenship began to infiltrate even the expressions of advocacy.”299 In other words, participants began to discover
existing public values and create new public values through deliberation over the uneven effects of any course of action.300 Observers noted
that through this process, citizens were able—however briefly—to
“transcend their narrower self-interests” by “identify[ing] what they
value most about the community” and “uncover[ing] [common] goals
and commitments” to achieve that community.301
The workshops were also beneficial for the agency. Regional EPA
officials believed that the experience of the workshops “increased the
sensitivity of EPA leaders to the problems faced by agency employees.”302 EPA staff learned how best to present scientific or technical
information to facilitate fruitful deliberation, and as a result, the regional staff came to understand local dynamics.303 Tellingly, regional
officials kept their colleagues from Washington from leading the public workshops because their overly technical approach was ineffective
with local residents.304
The Asarco example is by no means perfect. It was time-consuming,305 and though not related to the experiment itself, the fact that
nothing came of the workshops probably did not foster enthusiasm for
another attempt. Nevertheless, the experiment provides insight into
how to structure public control over regulatory decisions. First, some
decisions might benefit from being made at a local or regional level.
Second, and equally important, if members of a community who hold
different political positions interact consistently, they may foster a
greater sense of community that can respond to thorny policy issues.

297. See id.
298. Id. at 1635.
299. Id. (quoting Interview by Robert B. Reich with William Ruckleshaus (Feb. 27,
1985)).
300. See id. at 1636.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 1639.
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Small Councils: The Promise of Local Control of
Regulatory Policy

The belief that some decisions are better left to local, rather than
national, bodies is an old one in American politics, and the Asarco experiment demonstrated the promise of delegating certain decisions to
local control. The Constitution itself enshrines principles of federalism, leaving to states the bulk of lawmaking.306 Thomas Jefferson was
famously in favor of local wards to engage every person in government.307 Lately the pendulum in the American administrative state
has swung too far toward placing regulatory authority with national
bodies. In response, some modern republican theorists have proposed
pushing more government decisions down to the local level—not only
to engage citizens in their government but also because at that level,
citizens can interact with each other to form opinions about public issues and common desires or hash out divergent views in hopes of discovering new public values.308 It is in these interactions where
citizens can develop and practice the virtues required for collective action. As Tocqueville put it, local “institutions are to freedom what primary schools are to knowledge: they bring it within people’s reach and
give men the enjoyment and habit of using it for peaceful ends.”309 It
is also at the local level where the scale of government becomes manageable for the individual because the public values of the individuals
that compose the community can be identified in the actions of government. It is obviously much more difficult on a national, or even regional, scale for individual citizens to see themselves in the actions of
their government, but certain regulatory decisions that have primarily local (or possibly regional) effects could be delegated to local assemblies open to all and entrusted with developing and deciding on
the appropriate regulation.
Some legal scholars have also advocated for federal decentralization of certain government functions. For example, Professor David
Fontana has argued that “federal decentralization makes local majorities into neighbors of federal officials, rather than servants to
them. . . . Federal officials hear more and hear better about the concerns of locals once they live amongst them and come to care more
about addressing their concerns.”310 Though Fontana does not go so
far as to propose handing over control of some decisions to local coun306. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
307. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph C. Cabell (Feb. 2, 1816), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-09-02-0286 [https://perma.cc/Z92P53BW].
308. SANDEL, supra note 103, at 346–47; HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 256–57 (3d
prtg. 1966).
309. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 278, at 73.
310. David Fontana, Federal Decentralization, 104 VA. L. REV. 727, 771 (2018).
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cils or assemblies, the sentiment is similar. Citizens far from Washington want to see their particular concerns and interests represented
in the content of the laws and regulations that govern their lives. “If
all or the most important parts of the federal government were in
Washington, then the rich diversity of the large American republic
would be neglected, and a narrow group of individuals would control
the country.”311 Permitting some decisions to be made by local participatory political bodies would ensure that local concerns tend to
govern issues of local import.312
Determining which decisions could be made at the local level would
be a difficult, but not an impossible, task. After all, numerous federal
statutes already make these kinds of distinctions. The Clean Water
Act,313 the Clean Air Act,314 the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act,315 and a host of others all rely on “cooperative federalism,” which
divides some duties between local authorities and the federal bureaucracy.316 Though not made pursuant to a cooperative federalism statute, the Park Service’s decision regarding jet ski regulation in
Assateague Island National Seashore is another possible candidate for
local control.317
How to structure the local assemblies poses another difficult, but
not insurmountable, problem. As the Asarco example reveals, local assemblies can be conducted in a fashion where technical information is
conveyed effectively to participants. Participants should be permitted
to hold an informed and serious debate on what to do with that information. With the right training, local or regional agency officials can
act both as facilitators of discussion within the assemblies and technical staff of the assembly, gathering—and if need be, conducting—research on the topic at issue.
The operation of this kind of assembly could be modeled off of the
citizen assembly called in British Columbia in 2001 to redesign the
provincial electoral system.318 One hundred sixty members of the pub311. Id.
312. One of Professor Fontana’s primary concerns is the concentration of power in the
Executive Branch. See id. at 789–90. He proposes federal decentralization as a
complement to the federal separation of powers to further diffuse concentrated
executive power. Id.
313. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1388.
314. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q.
315. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 277.
316. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why
State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV.
813, 815 (1998) (describing “cooperative federalism” as cooperation between state
and local governments and the federal government in a large number of policy
areas).
317. See supra Part I.
318. See generally John Ferejohn, The Citizen’s Assembly Model, in DESIGNING DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: THE BRITISH COLUMBIA CITIZEN ASSEMBLY 192, 197–200
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lic were randomly chosen to participate in the assembly.319 The assembly was tasked with producing a recommendation on changes to
the electoral system that would be put to a referendum.320 The assembly was designed so that its members had access to a professional staff
and the ability to call expert witnesses to testify about the competing
courses of action.321 Professional staff assigned to the assembly organized the meetings, set the agenda, and helped shape the list of experts
called to testify.322 Though assembly members were chosen randomly
from the public, they asked “probing and difficult questions” of the
witnesses.323 The substance of these questions demonstrated that assembly members gained a technical knowledge of electoral systems.324
Political scientists who observed the deliberations concluded that “ordinary citizens” were capable of deliberating about electoral systems
“in an intelligent and informed way.”325 Ultimately, the assembly’s
recommendation carried nearly sixty percent of the vote in the
referendum.326
Four points about the structure of the British Columbia assembly
should be noted. First, at times the professional staff made decisions
that might have changed the direction of deliberations in the assembly
in a way that was not always known to the assembly members.327 One
reason why professional staff pushed deliberations in a particular direction may be that the assembly members were, at least at first, relatively inexperienced. Were these kinds of assemblies adopted widely,
professional staff would likely take on less of the operation of the assembly over time because citizens would become experts in assembly
procedure and in certain areas of regulation. Second, the chair of the
assembly was a professional public servant, and his rulings were final
and not appealable to the entire assembly.328 That arrangement
might be appropriate for a one-off assembly, but for citizens more
practiced in the art of participating in an assembly, the rulings of the
chair of the assembly should be open to appeal to the entire body.

319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

(Mark E. Warren & Hilary Pearse eds., 2008) (describing the citizen assembly
that took place in British Columbia).
Kevin O’Leary, The Citizen Assembly: An Alternative to the Initiative, 78 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1489, 1497–98 (2007).
Ferejohn, supra note 318, at 197–98.
Id. at 198–99.
Id. at 199.
Id. at 198.
Id. at 199.
Id. at 200. “Their deliberations were intense and serious: members came with
open minds and did in fact change their views and arguments over the course of
the proceedings.” Id.
Dennis Pilon, The 2005 and 2009 Referenda on Voting System Change in British
Columbia, 4 CANADIAN POL. SCI. REV. 73, 73–74 (2010).
Ferejohn, supra note 318, at 199.
Id.
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Third, the assembly in British Columbia was populated by random
selection.329 Whether this should be a universal feature of these types
of assemblies is an open question. For local decisions, no restrictions
may be needed.330 For decisions made on a regional level, a random
selection may be required to keep the number of participants manageable. If the latter course is chosen, assemblies must be held often
enough and with enough participants so that every citizen would have
the chance to participate multiple times in their adult lives. A onetime affair would not give citizens the repeated interactions that are
needed to foster the kind of habits necessary for self-government. Finally, the assembly in British Columbia only had the power to propose
a policy to then be submitted to a referendum.331 Due to the frequency
of regulatory decisions, and to foster the conditions of responsibility
required to cultivate the virtues of citizenship, the assembly should
have the power to both propose the regulation and decide on it.
B.

Great Councils: How a National Popular Assembly Might
Work

What of decisions to be made at the national level? Certain regulations have such great national importance and have national effects
that the proper place for their development and promulgation is at the
national level. For example, certain financial regulations affecting all
publicly traded companies and regulations like the Waters of the
United States rule, which sets the jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act
across the entire nation,332 should be developed nationally. In these
instances, a similar citizen assembly model can be used. Each agency
could convene its own assembly of a few hundred citizens drawn at
random. Those selected would be required to attend by law, but their
expenses (including dependent care) would be covered by the government for as long as the assembly was in session.333 Their employers
would be reimbursed for their salary and would be prevented by law
from penalizing or firing an employee who was called to partici329. Id. at 197.
330. There have been longstanding criticisms of purely volunteer public bodies. For a
comical, but unsettling, account of the perils of volunteer fee-for-service juries in
classical Athens, see ARISTOPHANES, WASPS (Alan H. Sommerstein ed. & trans.,
2004) (422 B.C.E.). Nevertheless, the New England town hall meeting as described by Tocqueville provides an apt counterexample. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra
note 278, at 73–82.
331. Ferejohn, supra note 318, at 198.
332. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg.
37,053 (June 29, 2015) (codified in scattered parts of C.F.R. ch. 33 and C.F.R. ch.
40).
333. See generally Lawrence Lessig, Rendering Sensible Salient, 27 GOOD SOC’Y, 171,
175 (2018) (describing a proposal for citizen assemblies to decide on issues for a
constitutional convention). The proposals Lessig suggests are clearly applicable
to the kind of assembly I have proposed for regulatory policy.
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pate.334 Similar to the British Columbia citizen assembly, these assemblies convened by agencies would rely on professional staff to
facilitate the deliberation, but they would also have the ability to call
expert witnesses not employed by the agency. Interested parties could
submit proposals to the assembly but could not directly lobby the
members. At the end of the assembly, the participants would compose
and then vote on the regulation. Again, enough of these assemblies
with enough participants should be convened so that every American
has a real chance of participating in at least one national assembly
once in their lifetime. Combined with participating in local or regional
assemblies, each citizen would have numerous opportunities to develop habits of self-government and influence the content of
regulations.
These proposals are not meant to be exhaustive. Much work still
needs to be done on how to give the public a dispositive role in administrative decisions. The first step is to see the value in cultivating citizens—not only for the stability and effectiveness of government but
also for the ability to live freely by realizing their distinctive capacities
through self-government.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Questioning the legitimacy of the administrative state has become
something of a modern American pastime.335 In that sense, this Article continues a long and august tradition of finding fault with the socalled fourth branch. That debates about the administrative state continue to this day is, however, good evidence that our forebearers have
failed to put to rest fundamental questions about the source of legitimacy of agencies’ lawmaking power. In our own time, this challenge
comes most squarely from populist and antiestablishment political
movements that are suspicious that the professionalism, independence, and technocratic know-how of agencies are only a deceptive carapace for the policy preferences of economic and political elites. The
populist critique is too blunt, but it is not entirely mistaken. Modern
administrative law scholars have not taken this critique seriously
enough, often overlooking how the pathologies of a liberal rationalist
administrative state have contributed to the populist critique today.
Agencies are far more receptive to technical comments than comments from the general public. Their continued public commitment to
a rationalist liberal conception of government opens agencies to the
334. See id.
335. See Cynthia R. Farina, Against Simple Rules for a Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT.
L. REV. 987, 987 (1997) (likening critiques of the administrative state to an “awkward family heirloom” that “is handed down from generation to generation”);
FREEDMAN, supra note 23, at 9 (describing how each successive generation has
sought to quell new concerns about the legitimacy of the administrative state).
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views of economic elites but denies the general public a place to debate
and contest regulatory policy. The result is that although agencies
publicly justify their lawmaking power on neutral technocratic expertise, they in fact make value judgments that are not open to democratic control and consequently shutter the public space in which
citizens develop the capacities to come together to debate and decide
public values that are at the heart of so many regulatory decisions.
By turning away from the liberal rationalist approach to government and toward a robust republican account of administration, the
importance of democratic control over regulatory decisions becomes
clear. Creating the space for citizens to debate and deliberate with
each other will allow those citizens to develop judgment, deliberation,
persuasion, and action—the very qualities that make self-government
possible.

